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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND ABSTRACT 
In this report I detail how I have investigated the feasibility of producing a systems engineering 
framework that can be applied to all forms of Railway Control & Safety (RCS) systems in order to simplify 
their development, delivery and implementation. Based on this research, I propose two simple models 
that can be used to model conventional signalling, ERTMS, CBTC and PTC systems; a functional model 
and a physical model. 
I have looked into how these models can be utilised to model specific systems and how this can then be 
used to identify the high-level functionality and interfaces of individual sub-systems across different 
physical locations and organisations. I go on to propose a simple method to keep track of individual sub-
system locations and their high-level functionality. I also propose how the functional model can be 
represented as a negative-feedback control system. 
I then examined the development and implementation of RCS systems and propose that these systems 
go through two unique V-cycles, a generic product development V-cycle (by suppliers) and a specific 
application V-cycle (by operators). I propose that this results in the whole system lifecycle being covered 
by a closed-loop W-cycle that shows the complete development and procurement process for most 
metro railway RCS systems. I go on to propose that a more complex process is often required on 
mainline railways where there are often multiple sub-systems that are procured from separate suppliers 
and must be integrated into a single system. 
I conclude with a study of different project delivery structures for RCS upgrade programmes and 
recommend a balanced system-centric structure. 
My conclusions are that RCS systems are critical to both the safety and performance of the railway and 
are complex systems of systems. They have clearly defined functional sub-systems that contribute to 
these two key criteria. Based on my findings, I suggest that a systematic approach to the development, 
as well as the deployment, of RCS is therefore vital in order to ensure successful development, delivery 
and integration of modern RCS systems, such as ERTMS, TMS & DAS.  
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Glossary of Terms 
The following section is used to define the meanings of the major terms and abbreviations that shall be 
adopted in this thesis. In many cases, there are different uses of the same terms and different terms to 
describe the same components and functionalities and these will be mentioned, where appropriate. 
Reference is made to the concept of the railway as a ‘system of systems’, which has emerging properties 
that are more advanced than those of the individual components (Hossein, et al., 2015). 
4-Foot 
The space between the running rails on an individual track of operational railway. 
ARS: Automatic Route Setting 
A component of a railway system of systems that automatically routes trains around the network 
according to a pre-loaded timetable. 
ATC: Automatic Train Control 
The combination of the ATO and ATP sub-systems. The ATP sub-system overrides the ATO system on the 
rare occasions where the latter malfunctions, e.g., in low adhesion situations. In some regions of the 
world, notably the USA, the term automatic train control or ATC refers to the automatic train protection 
functionality. 
ATO: Automatic Train Operation 
The component within a railway system of systems that replaces the driver and stops the trains at 
required points (usually stations). There are different levels of automation, e.g., attended and 
unattended operation. 
ATP: Automatic Train Protection 
The component within a railway system of systems that prevents trains from proceeding past their MA. 
ATR: Automatic Train Regulation 
The component within a railway system of systems that automatically routes trains throughout the 
network to optimize the performance of the network. 
ATS: Automatic Train Supervision 
The component within a railway system of systems that continuously monitors the positions and speeds 
of all trains on a line or network and controls their behaviour by means of ATR to achieve optimal 
operation. 
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CBI: Computer Based Interlocking 
A failsafe computer system that provides interlocking functionality for a railway system, such as Solid 
State Interlocking (SSI), WESTLOCK & SMARTLOCK. 
CBTC: Communications Based Train Control 
A type of railway control that includes ATC and ATS sub-systems and uses radio or inductive 
transmission between the infrastructure and the trains, often enabling some form of moving block 
functionality. In some circles CBTC stands for Computer Based Train Control due to the heavy 
microelectronic-based computer systems in its design. 
CSS: Cab Signal System 
Any system that utilises an in-cab display to relay safety-critical movement authority data to the driver 
via a wireless communications channel. 
Conventional Signalling 
Any signalling and protection system that is based around the driver observing the indications of lineside 
signals to determine their right to proceed. 
CTC: Centralised Traffic Control 
A centralised OCS that provides automatic routeing functions for optimised traffic management. 
CTCS: Chinese Train Control System 
The Chinese standard system for ATP and in-cab signalling. Split into levels of operation very similar to 
ETCS. 
Danger Point 
The point beyond the LMA that the front of a train must not pass at a given point in time in order to 
avoid a hazardous situation. 
DAS: Driver Advisory System 
System that provides in-cab information to the train operator on how to optimise their driving style for 
consistency and efficiency. This can be combined with information received from the TMS via radio link 
to provide additional information to better regulate service in a similar way to ATO; this is known as 
Connected-DAS or C-DAS. 
ERTMS: European Rail Traffic Management System 
The European railway control system that consists of ETCS, ETML and GSM-R. 
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ETCS: European Train Control System 
The European standard ATP system that allows interoperability across borders and between equipment 
from different manufacturers. ETCS Level 1 is overlaid to conventional line-side signals and provides 
standard ATP functionality with continuous supervision of a train’s speed and MA. ETCS Level 2 can 
operate both with and without lineside signals and includes an advanced in-cab display of the changing 
MA and speed limits (UNIFE, 2013). 
ETML: European Traffic Management Layer 
The proposed standardized European operating rules and ATS functions. 
GOA: Grade Of Automation 
Level of train control automation of a system, see Table 2-1. 
GSM-R: Global System for Mobile communications – Railways 
The European standard communications system for mainline railways that is based on the GSM standard 
and offers additional functionality, e.g., group calls and prioritization of calls. Within Europe, GSM-R is 
allocated to the radio spectrum in the 876-880 MHz band for Uplink and the 921-925 MHz band for 
Downlink. However it has also been implemented in other countries outside the EU utilizing different 
bandwidths (UNIFE, 2013). 
IM: Infrastructure Manager 
“Any body or firm responsible for establishing, managing and maintaining railway infrastructure 
(including traffic management and control-command and signalling)”, quoted from (RNE, 2013). 
Inx: Interlocking 
System which prevents conflicting routes to be set on a railway network. 
LMA: Limit of Movement Authority 
The point on the running line that a train is not authorised to pass at a given point in time during its 
journey. 
MA: Movement Authority 
The point on a running line that an individual train can safely travel to at a given point in time during its 
journey based on the speed of the train and the limits of the infrastructure. 
Mainline 
For the purposes of this report, Mainline refers to any heavy railway network that transports people 
between cities or across countries. 
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Metro 
For the purposes of this report, Metro refers to any city or suburban railway that provides mass transit 
of people. 
OCS: Operational Control System 
A Visual Display Unit (VDU) based system that allows central control of a railway. 
Protected Area 
Another term for the Limit of Movement Authority. 
PSD: Platform Screen Door 
The component of the railway system of systems that protects the passenger at the Platform-Train 
Interface (PTI). 
PTC: Positive Train Control 
The USA’s standard for in-cab signalling and ATP. 
RU: Railway Undertaking 
“Any public or private undertaking whose principal business is to provide services for the transport of 
goods and/or passengers by rail”, quoted from (RNE, 2013).  
TETRA: Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
Radio communication system often utilised for CBTC systems and favoured by emergency services for its 
resilience (TETRA and Oxford Information Labs., 2016). 
TMS: Traffic Management System 
A system that regulates and optimises the flow and routing of trains around a railway network. 
UNIFE: Union des Industries Ferroviaires Européennes 
An association of Europe’s rail supply companies active in the design, manufacture, maintenance and 
refurbishment of rail transport systems, subsystems and related equipment. (UNIFE, 2013) 
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List of Abbreviations 
AADL Architecture Analysis & Design Language 
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ACSES Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 
AD Axiomatic Design 
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GPS Global Positioning System 
GSM-R Global System for Mobile – Railways 
ICAM Integrated Computer-Aided Manufacturing 
IDEF ICAM Definition for Function Modelling 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers 
IET Institution of Engineering & Technology 
I-ETMS Interoperable Electronic Train Management System 
IFD Information Flow Diagram 
IM Infrastructure Manager 
INCOSE INternational Council On Systems Engineering 
Inx Interlocking 
IRSE Institution of Railway Signal Engineers 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ITC Interoperable Train Control 
ITCS Incremental Train Control System 
KRTCS Korean Radio-based Train Control System 
MATLAB MATrix LABoratory 
MODAF Ministry Of Defence Architecture Framework 
NDGPS Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System 
NR Network Rail 
NTR National Technical Rule 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
LEU Lineside Encoder Unit 
LU London Underground 
OCS Operational Control System 
P&C Points and Crossings 
PCB Printed Circuit Board 
PTC Positive Train Control 
RBC Radio Block Centre 
RBTC Radio Based Train Control 
RCS Railway Control & Safety 
RNE Rail Network Europe 
RP Route Performance 
RRAUK Rail Research Association UK 
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board 
RTS Railway Technical Strategy 
RU Railway Undertaking 
S&P Safety and Protection 
SADT Structured Analysis and Design Technique 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SOS System Of Systems 
SRS System Requirements Specification 
SSI Solid State Interlocking 
SysML System Modelling Language 
TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
TfL Transport for London 
TMS Traffic Management System 
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TP Train Performance 
TPH Trains Per Hour 
TPWS Train Protection & Warning System 
TSI Technical Standard for Interoperability 
U-DAS Unconnected Driver Advisory System 
UK United Kingdom 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
UNIFE Union des Industries Ferroviaires Européennes 
USA United States of America 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VDU Visual Display Unit 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional railway signalling systems have been based around fixed block train separation and 
line-of-sight signals to control the movement of trains and ensure collision avoidance. This has 
historically led to a segregation of both the functionality and the development of sub-systems 
such as signalling, rolling stock and control centres, with them following a very narrow, 
sequential & design-based approach in their development and delivery (Schmid, 2002).  (King, 
2016) 
Recent developments on Radio-Based Train Control (RBTC) systems including the European Rail 
Traffic Management System (ERTMS) for mainline (Poré, 2003) and Communications Based Train 
Control (CBTC) systems for metro lines (Scheerer & Baker, 2003) have resulted in more complex 
systems with greater sub-system interactions as movement authorities are transmitted over a 
wireless communications channel between the protection system and the train. This has led to a 
requirement for a systems engineering based approach to the development and deployment of 
these complete systems (Moens & Stokes, 2003). (King, 2016) 
The railway industry has at times struggled to embrace systems engineering (Doherty & Harmon, 
2007), as it is perceived to run against the safety-focused design-based approach that rightfully 
enjoys a high status within the industry (Cooksey, 2001). Many engineers in the industry who are 
familiar with the traditional design based approach also struggle with relating the new systems 
to the traditional principles that they are used to (Keseljevic, 2005). (King, 2016) 
This research investigates the feasibility of producing a systems engineering framework that can be 
applied to all forms of Railway Control & Safety (RCS) systems in order to simplify their development and 
delivery. 
Parts of this thesis have been published in the following papers produced by myself: 
 ‘Systems Engineering Framework for Railway Control and Safety Systems’ IRSE News Issue 218, 
2016 
 ‘Systems Engineering Framework for Railway Control and Safety Systems’ 2016 IEEE 
International Conference on Intelligent Rail Transportation (ICIRT), 2016 
 ‘Event Report on Systems Engineering for Train Control and Communications’ IRSE News Issue 
224, 2016 
 ‘A Systems Engineering Framework for Railway Control & Safety System: The Mainline 
Challenge’ Stephenson Conference, 2017 
 ‘Systematic Approach to Command Control Signalling CBTC Projects,’ Systems Engineering 
Community Newsletter, Mott MacDonald, November 2012 
 ‘Delivering ERTMS Systems,’ Systems Engineering Community Newsletter, Mott MacDonald, 
March 2013 
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Parts have also been utilised for a paper entitled ‘Railway Control & Safety Systems as a Closed Loop 
Negative Feedback Control System’ that has been submitted for the IET International Conference on 
Railway Engineering (ICRE) 2018. 
Short quotations in this thesis from other texts are shown in quotation marks “”; longer quotations are 
indented. 
1.1 Overview of Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is broken up into 3 main parts: 
A. Chapters 1 & 2 introduce the thesis’s main concepts, as well as the main literature review 
detailing the academic background, including the basics of systems engineering, as well as the 
history of RCS systems and how they are currently developed and delivered. 
B. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 look at the unique challenges of RCS systems and how systems 
engineering tools and techniques could improve their development & delivery, including from a 
project management perspective. 
C. Chapter 9 details the findings of this research and recommendations for future work that could 
follow on from it. 
1.2 Reason for Research 
Traditional signalling based on fixed lineside signals is becoming increasingly redundant as the 
railway industry embraces modern systems such as the ERTMS and CBTC. With the change to 
these complex systems of systems also comes a change in the way in which the industry must 
develop and deliver what were traditionally ‘signalling’ projects. (King, 2016) 
The industry must move away from what has traditionally been a very process-driven design to a 
systematic one that delivers functionality across a series of sub-systems. (King, 2016) 
However, the design principles required by these systems will remain fundamentally the same as those 
of conventional signalling, requiring traditional signalling design engineers to work closely with modern 
system engineers who often use different approaches, methods and terminology. 
This research was therefore proposed to determine if a common system engineering framework could 
be developed that would apply to all forms of modern (and potential future) RCS systems that could be 
understood by both signalling design engineers and RCS systems engineers. 
1.3 Academic Questions 
The aim of this research was to investigate the following questions: 
1. How are complex systems of systems like RCS traditionally modelled and developed? 
2. What are the past and present concepts of RCS? 
3. Can a systems model be produced that is representative of all forms of RCS? 
4. How would specific RCS systems map onto the generic model? 
5. Is there a systematic method to develop and deliver any type of RCS system? 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
The research was predominantly carried out in a desktop environment by extensive reading of academic 
papers and text, as well as drawing significantly on my own experiences within the railway industry. For 
this reason, a copy of my Curriculum Vitae (CV) is provided in Appendix A. 
I started by conducting a literature review into the developments of the most common RCS systems and 
how they are delivered, before further reading up on the latest developments in systems engineering, 
particularly relating to the areas of systems of systems and systems modelling. 
I then started to investigate the fundamental requirements of any RCS system and from that developed 
a generic model that any RCS system could be mapped on to, before investigating how this model could 
be used to model the functionality of an RCS system to assist with design and development. 
Finally, I looked into the delivery models and organisational structures often utilised within the industry 
for developing and delivering RCS systems and investigated if approaching the development of these 
structures systematically could improve how we develop and deliver RCS projects. 
1.5 Scope of Research 
The scope of this research covers the application of recognised systems engineering tools and 
techniques to modern forms of RCS on both mainline and metro railway systems. 
This will include: 
 Systems based around fixed light indications (hereafter referred to as ‘conventional signalling). 
Predominantly based around the signalling principles of the United Kingdom (UK) that the 
author is most familiar with. 
 Communication Based Train Control (CBTC). The most common form of modern train control 
and protection utilised on Metro railways. 
 European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). The European standard for modern 
mainline railway train control and protection. 
 Positive Train Control (PTC). The United States of America (USA) standard for modern mainline 
railway train control and protection. 
In terms of fundamental system engineering, (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) define four 
recognised main stages of the systems engineering lifecycle, namely: 
 Pre-acquisition 
 Acquisition 
 Utilisation 
 Retirement 
This research predominantly covers the Acquisition and Utilisation phases of RCS projects. 
(Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) breakdown of the four activities is shown in Fig.  1-1. 
(King, 2016) 
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Fig.  1-1 Systems Engineering Lifecycle (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) 
The main activities associated with the Acquisition Phase and their associated major milestones 
and outputs are defined by (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) as per the diagram in Fig.  1-2. (King, 
2016) 
 
Fig.  1-2 Activities in the Acquisition Phase (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) 
From discussions with a colleague who has extensive systems engineering management 
experience (Williamson, 2015), I propose that there are three key aspects to successful project 
development and delivery: 
1. Process 
2. Technology 
3. People 
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Process
Technology People
Success!  
Fig.  1-3 Aspects of Project Delivery That Must be Integrated (Williamson, 2015) 
It is only when all three of these aspects or components are developed and aligned correctly as 
shown in Fig.  1-3 that a project is successful. It is in the investigation of successfully bringing 
these three elements together for the development and deployment of RCS systems that this 
research was carried out. 
(King, 2016) 
1.6 Requirements for RCS Systems 
RCS is a complex System Of Systems (SOS) and therefore requires careful planning and extensive 
development work for its implementation. It is my opinion that the development and requirements of 
RCS should be approached from the top-down waterfall model method of Systems Engineering 
(Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014). In other words, start with the business (or industry) needs and from these 
develop fundamental requirements for the system which lead to system requirements which lead to 
sub-system requirements etc. 
If we start at the top level, the industry needs of RCS are usually to move x amount of passengers and/or 
y amount of freight product within timeframe z and achieve this completely safely. 
From these needs, it can be derived that there are three fundamental requirements to any RCS 
system: 
A. Ensure safe running of trains 
B. Route trains around the network efficiently 
C. Have each train run at its optimal performance 
We can map these requirements onto normal working operations where: 
1. The Signaller will request a route through the Control System. 
2. The Control System will request this route from the Interlocking System. 
3. The Interlocking System determines that the route can be set safely. 
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4. The Interlocking System transmits the permitted movement authority to the Train by 
setting the appropriate signal indications for the route selected. 
5. The Driver will interpret these signals to drive their individual train safely and efficiently.  
(King, 2016) 
This complete flow can be shown in the model in Fig.  1-4.  
 
Fig.  1-4 Common Sub-systems of Conventional Signalling (King, 2016) 
1.7 Types of RCS Systems 
Modern RCS systems vary greatly depending on if they are for Metro or Mainline applications and where 
they are deployed in the world, as different countries have different standards. However, there are 4 
broad categories of RCS system that can (potentially) be applied worldwide, as described in Section 2.5: 
1. Conventional Signalling 
2. CBTC 
3. ERTMS 
4. PTC 
The Sections of this Chapter will define each of these systems in more detail. 
1.7.1 Conventional Signalling 
There are literally hundreds of different railway signalling systems currently implemented throughout 
the world which utilise different principles of design and safety legislation, most of which is based on 
historical legislation and the culture within different countries. However, they are all based on the 
fundamental safety principles of: 
1. Ensuring safe separation between trains 
2. Ensuring safety of trains at junctions and crossings 
Routes Trains Efficiently 
Ensures Safety 
Optimal Train Performance 
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As shown in Sections 2.4.2 & 2.4.3, most modern railways achieve these through the use of: 
1. Block-section train detection (using either axle counters or track circuits) 
2. An interlocking system (either relay or computer based) 
3. An ATP system (either intermittent or continuous) 
Most of these railways are based around utilising indications from the lineside to the driver (often in the 
form of multiple-aspect colour-light signals). 
They are also generally controlled from some form of modern control centre that utilises a server-based 
electronic control system with Visual Display Unit (VDU) terminals. Though some do still utilise other 
systems such as lever locks and push-button panels, these will be excluded for the purposes of this 
research as they are being gradually phased out. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this research, conventional signalling shall be defined as a railway that 
utilises a system comprising of the following sub-systems as shown in Fig.  1-5: 
1. Operational Control System (OCS) 
2. Block-based Train Detection 
3. Interlocking system 
4. ATP 
5. Multi-aspect signals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  1-5 Conventional Signalling System 
1.7.2 CBTC 
CBTC is defined by IEEE standard 1474.1 as, “The use of a Communications channel to relay Safety 
Critical Train Control Information between the Signaller and the Train Operator.” (IEEE, 2011) 
 
 
 
ATP 
ATP 
Fixed Block Section with Train Detection (TD) 
Multi-aspect Signals 
OCS Interlocking 
(Inx) 
  
21 
 
From this, any modern form of RCS, including ETCS, PTC and certain ATP systems, can all be defined as 
CBTC. However, CBTC has also become a byword for the fully automated railway signalling deployed on 
(predominantly) metro railways. This Section (1.7.2) will look exclusively at these metro systems and 
how they are built up. 
1.7.2.1 Fixed Block Systems 
Most modern metro CBTC systems utilise Automatic Train Control (ATC) that comprises of two main 
parts: Automatic Train Operation (ATO) and Automatic Train Protection (ATP), as shown in Fig.  1-6. 
 
 Fig.  1-6 Automatic Train Control Sub-Systems 
ATO is responsible purely for performance (i.e. driving trains between designated stop points), while 
ATP is responsible for maintaining safety (ensuring collision avoidance, etc.). This is because the ATO is a 
simple unit with two inputs and two outputs; as shown in Fig.  1-7, all it needs to know is: 
 The limit of its movement authority (LMA) 
 What speed the train is going at in order to apply the required motoring or braking 
 
 
 
 
 Fig.  1-7 Principles of ATO 
If all trains on the line are fitted with ATC, there is no need for traditional line of sight signals as shown in 
Fig.  1-8. 
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Fig.  1-8 Fixed Block ATO 
1.7.2.2 Moving Block Systems 
What is generally known as CBTC in terms of metro systems (see introduction of Section 1.7.2) is the 
addition of Automatic Train Supervision (ATS). ATS is a set of functionality that automates things such as 
route setting to enable a more efficient service very similar to the Traffic Management System (TMS) for 
mainline systems (see Section 1.7.5.1). 
 
Fig.  1-9 CBTC Sub-systems 
By continuously detecting each train’s exact position on the line (usually achieved by every train 
registering regular fixed points from the infrastructure and continuously updating a central system of its 
position using its odometer), it is possible for these systems to run every train as close as possible to the 
subsequent train by means of a closed loop control system. This is known as Moving Block and is 
illustrated in Fig.  1-10. 
 
Fig.  1-10 Moving Block ATO 
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1.7.3 ERTMS 
The European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is the new standard for interoperable railway 
systems within Europe. It is made up of three main parts as shown in Fig.  1-11. 
 
Fig.  1-11 ERTMS Sub-Systems 
The Global System for Mobiles – Railways (GSM-R) is to be the standard radio communications system 
for railways, providing both voice and data. 
The European Traffic Management Layer (ETML), combined with the European Operating Rules, are a 
standard set of operating principles to provide optimised traffic management, utilising tools such as 
automatic route setting, etc. 
The European Traffic Management System (ETCS) is to be the standard train protection system for 
Europe. ETCS can be delivered in one of three levels; in all levels, the driver has a display in their cab 
known as a Driver-Machine Interface (DMI) which tells them their permitted Movement Authority (MA) 
in the form of a target speed that they must drive to. If the driver goes over this permitted speed, then 
the system intervenes and automatically applies braking. An overview of each of the 3 levels is given in 
the following sub-sections of this Section. 
1.7.3.1 ETCS Level 1 
Level 1 acts as an overlay for existing conventional schemes and utilises radio beacons known as balises 
embedded in the 4-foot connected to the interlocking via a Lineside Equipment Unit (LEU). These balises 
transmit the permitted MA to the train as it passes over them, though the MA remains the signal 
indication, not the balise.  
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Fig.  1-12 ETCS Level 1 (without infill) (UNIFE, 2013) 
It is also possible to make use of an infill loop or radio infill between balises to update the MA more 
continuously, thus enabling the driver to have earlier indication of a signal change. 
 
Fig.  1-13 ETCS Level 1 (with infill) (UNIFE, 2013) 
1.7.3.2 ETCS Level 2 
Level 2 utilises the GSM-R system to continuously transmit the MA to the train via a Radio Block Centre 
(RBC) which is connected to the interlocking, meaning that there is no longer a need for lineside signals. 
Balises are still used but now act as autonomous position references only. 
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Fig.  1-14 ETCS Level 2 (UNIFE, 2013) 
1.7.3.3 ETCS Level 3 
In Level 3, conventional forms of train detection (such as axle counters or track circuits) are removed 
and the train maintains its own integrity, allowing the train to run within virtual blocks or on moving 
block. 
 
Fig.  1-15 ETCS Level 3 (UNIFE, 2013)  
1.7.4 PTC 
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) states that, “PTC is a system of functional requirements for 
monitoring and controlling train movements as an attempt to provide increased safety” (FRA, 2008). It 
has been defined by the United States of America (USA) to increase safety across its railway networks. 
The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) describes Positive 
Train Control as having the following primary characteristics: 
1. Train separation or collision avoidance 
2. Line speed enforcement 
3. Temporary speed restrictions 
4. Rail worker wayside safety 
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The main concept in PTC (as defined for North American Class I freight railroads) is that the train 
receives information about its location and where it is allowed to safely travel, also known as 
movement authorities. Equipment on board the train then enforces this, preventing unsafe 
movement. PTC systems may work in either dark territory or signalled territory, and may use GPS 
navigation to track train movements. 
(AREMA, 2009) 
The FRA has listed among its goals: 
To deploy the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) as a nationwide, uniform, 
and continuous positioning system, suitable for train control. Various other benefits are sometimes 
associated with PTC such as increased fuel efficiency or locomotive diagnostics. These are benefits 
that can be achieved by having a wireless data system to transmit the information, whether it is for 
PTC or other applications. 
(AREMA, 2009). 
According to Amtrak: 
A typical PTC system involves two basic components: 
1. Speed display and control unit on the locomotive 
2. A method to dynamically inform the speed control unit of changing track or signal 
conditions. 
Optionally, three additional components may exist: 
1. An on-board navigation system and track profile database to enforce fixed speed limits 
2. A bi-directional data link to inform signalling equipment of the train's presence 
3. Centralized systems to directly issue movement authorities to trains 
(Amtrak, 2007) 
There are numerous versions of PTC that have been developed throughout North America. Some of 
these systems are based on existing technologies that have been ‘upgraded’ to meet the standard for 
PTC, whilst others are completely new systems that have been developed from first principles based on 
the new PTC requirements. An example ’generic’ system is shown below in Fig.  1-16.  
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Fig.  1-16 Example PTC System  
In the example shown in Fig.  1-16, the train utilises an electronic braking system to ensure its integrity 
and is also fitted with a Global Positioning System (GPS) transceiver. A centralised electronic interlocking 
system creates ‘virtual’ blocks on the track that exist in its memory only. Each train relays its location 
back to the central interlocking, which in turn grants each train its movement authority to enter 
whichever virtual block it is safe to do so. 
The following sub-sections summarise some of the main PTC systems currently being implemented in 
the USA as defined by AREMA. 
1.7.4.1 Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) 
“A transponder-based system, in use on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor.” (AREMA, 2009) 
1.7.4.2 Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) 
“A GPS and communications-based system being deployed by Burlington Northern and Santa Fe (BNSF) 
Railway.” (AREMA, 2009) 
1.7.4.3 Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) 
“A GPS and communications-based system, not yet ready for deployment” (AREMA, 2009) 
1.7.4.4 Incremental Train Control System (ITCS) 
“A GPS and communications-based system used by Amtrak on its Michigan line” (AREMA, 2009) 
1.7.4.5 Enhanced Automatic Train Control (E-ATC) 
A system that uses an underlying ATP system (referred to as ATC in North America), in conjunction 
with other “enhanced” features or systems to achieve the core required functionalities of PTC.  
These systems are often integrated with underlying Cab Signal Systems (CSS) and Centralised Traffic 
Control (CTC) systems, in addition to other signal or train control system enhancements the railroad 
elects to make to meet the full requirements of PTC. (AREMA, 2009) 
  
28 
 
1.7.5 Other Systems 
It may be clear from the previous Sections of this Chapter, that the two main new deployments of RCS 
on the mainline (ETCS and PTC) are predominantly analogous to the ATP element of CBTC. However, 
there are separate sub-systems that have been developed for the mainline that achieve functionality 
analogous to the ATS and ATO functions of CBTC. The two main systems of this type that are currently 
being deployed and under development, Traffic Management Systems (TMS) and Driver Advisory 
Systems (DAS), are defined in this Section. 
1.7.5.1 Traffic Management Systems 
Traffic Management Systems (TMS) have been developed to support line controllers with the efficient 
routing of trains and management of service. One of the main suppliers of TMS, Hitachi, defines it as 
providing some or all of the following features: 
1. Traffic Planning 
Creates train and staff rosters based on the traffic plan prepared, together with actual diagrams 
for the day's operations, and provides this information to the Operation Management System 
and operating companies. 
2. Operation Management System 
Automatically controls and sets routes for trains based on the train diagrams from the traffic 
plan. In the event of operational disruption, it continues Route Performance based on train 
diagrams changed using commands. 
3. Power Supply and Infrastructure 
Provides centralised management from a central power-supply control centre of the operational 
status of the electric railway substations and station power-supply facilities. Power-supply 
facilities are monitored and controlled based on the information processed. 
4. Information for Passengers 
Provides passenger information (display, announcement) relating to train departures and 
arrivals. Also provides accurate information based on information from the Operation 
Management System in the event of disruptions. 
5. Operation Information for Staff 
Provides station staff, maintenance staff, and train staff with the necessary working information 
regarding train operation status and the latest diagrams in real time. 
Provides support for the creation of maintenance schedules. Maintenance work is carried out 
safely and efficiently on-site, using portable wireless terminals to keep track of scheduling. 
6. Maintenance Support 
Provides station staff, maintenance staff, and train staff with the necessary working information 
regarding train operation status and the latest diagrams in real time. 
7. Driver-Only and Driverless Operation 
Provides systems supporting driver-only and driverless operation by linking the Operation 
Management System with platform gates and Automatic Train Operation (ATO) systems. 
(Hitachi, 2013) 
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TMS systems therefore form an intrinsic part of modern control centre systems providing functions such 
as automatic route-setting and real-time train diagram alterations using path manipulation to regulate 
the network efficiently. An example TMS architecture is shown in Fig.  1-17. 
 
Fig.  1-17 Example TMS System (Hitachi, 2013)  
1.7.5.2 Driver Advisory Systems 
Zhu, et al. defines that: 
Driver Advisory Systems (DAS) are designed to provide train operators with advisory information 
that lead to improved performance with less locomotive wear, higher energy efficiency and 
better service quality. DAS does not have a direct interface as such with the existing train 
control system; instead it is more concerned about train operators’ actions and human factors. 
(Zhu, et al., 2016) 
Many train operating companies have started to develop DAS systems that monitor the performance of 
the rolling stock systems and then provide guidance to the driver via an in-cab display on the best way 
to drive the train (i.e. level of motoring and braking) in order to optimise the fuel consumption 
efficiency. Such systems are sometimes referred to as Unconnected Driver Advisory Systems (U-DAS). 
Several operators and infrastructure managers are now expanding these systems by utilising a central 
infrastructure-based system that works with the TMS and other infrastructure systems to relay 
information to the trains about current trackside conditions whilst also receiving information on the 
trains’ current performance. The on-board DAS system can utilise all this information to provide the 
driver with guidance on not only how to optimise fuel efficiency, but also optimally drive the train for 
improved service performance. Systems such as this are often referred to as Connected Driver Advisory 
Systems (C-DAS). 
An example DAS display in shown in Fig.  1-18. 
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Fig.  1-18 Example DAS In-cab Display (Zhu, et al., 2016)  
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2. Literature Review 
A recent paper (Bouch & Roberts, 2013) highlighted the need to develop a better understanding of 
systems engineering within the UK railway industry. 
This paper recommends utilising the British railway group standards to identify systems interfaces and 
from these elicit models from a top-down systems engineering approach. 
Although this paper looks at this from a high-level point of view of the entire railway system, it does not 
go into detail for individual disciplines such as signalling and rolling stock. 
Also in the same publication was a paper (Liu, et al., 2013) that demonstrated a different approach to 
the development of train control. Utilising a classic railway junction as an example, the paper proposed 
utilising a ‘fault-tolerant approach to the scheme design’ as opposed to the usual conservative method 
of design. This would still achieve an acceptable level of safety, as well as achieve greater performance 
through the flexibility of the design. Utilising a systematic approach to the development of RCS systems 
may enable this sort of approach to be adopted more easily and reap the benefits of more flexible fault-
tolerant design. 
In 2012, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) published (on behalf of the industry) the technical 
strategy (RSSB, 2012) for the British railways over the next 30 years. In 2013, an Academic Response 
(RRAUK, 2013) to this strategy was produced by the Rail Research Association UK on behalf of UK 
academia. Both of these publications endorse the strategy of taking the railway as a whole system along 
with embracing more innovative solutions to problems. The strategy also specifies in its Control, 
Command & Communications section the vision for in-cab signalling and intelligent traffic control 
systems for efficient, safe and optimised train services. The Academic Response (RRAUK, 2013) states 
that through the Future Train Regulation Optimisation (FuTRO) programme, the UK is developing 
complete solutions that will utilise traffic management systems, ERTMS, automation and driver advisory 
systems to achieve this vision. All of these systems will need to work together as part of the complete 
train control system; hence a high-level system engineering framework of how these sub-systems will 
work together will be extremely useful to assist in achieving the strategy’s vision. 
A recent thesis (Woodland, 2004) lays down an overview of the fundamentals of ATP systems (which are 
in turn the basis for all RBTC systems) and discusses both the perception of them being expensive and 
some of the blockers that have historically prevented them from being widely adapted in the UK. 
This thesis provides an excellent high-level model of a complete railway system and also derives the 
major requirements of Train Control Systems. However, it does not investigate how to further develop 
these requirements into relevant sub-systems, nor does it explore the feasibility of segregating key 
functions such as safety, route optimisation and train performance. 
The thesis does, however, demonstrate how to utilise these different systems in order to optimise the 
performance of the railway onto which they are installed. However it does not consider how to develop 
and deliver these systems efficiently and achieve all requirements, which will be the fundamental basis 
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for my thesis. Another key aspect of my work will be that a Train Control System is in fact a ‘System of 
Systems’, which is also not covered in the aforementioned thesis. 
2.1 Systems of Systems 
The International Council of Systems Engineers (INCOSE) published a paper (DeRosal, et al., 2008) as 
part of their Systems Engineering Vision 2020. In this paper, they defined some of the key concepts for 
System of Systems (SOS) engineering for large complex systems, including train control systems for 
railways. Though the paper acknowledges that there is ‘no universally agreed set of principles’ for 
systems engineering, it does make the following assertions: 
1. There are classes of problems that require complex systems to deal with them. 
2. The engineering of a complex system is itself a complex problem. 
3. Complexity science can be used to inform the understanding and solution of such problems, 
including the development of enterprise systems engineering methods and tools. 
4. There are gaps in our scientific understanding of complexity, and in our ability to apply it, 
which if filled, would significantly expand the power and utility of our methods and tools for 
enterprise systems engineering. 
(DeRosal, et al., 2008) 
The paper goes on to discuss some of the common assumptions that are made in complex enterprise 
systems. The key message is that system engineering tools used for one industry or application may not 
be appropriate for another. This links in with my theory that it would be extremely useful to develop 
systems engineering tools and frameworks specifically for the railway industry. 
Another paper (Rebovich, 2008) goes on to explore how systems engineering, despite still being a fairly 
new discipline, has evolved over the years. It defines 3 stages that systems engineering has currently 
gone through: 
1. Classical Systems Engineering 
2. System of Systems Engineering 
3. Enterprise Systems Engineering 
(Rebovich, 2008) 
The author describes Classical Systems Engineering as being that defined in the INCOSE (ANSIIEIA 632) 
Systems Engineering process, that of, “A sequential, iterative development process used to produce 
systems and sub- systems.” (Rebovich, 2008) 
In terms of System of Systems Engineering, the author starts with what he terms the classical approach, 
which involves utilising “an executive oversight agency that aligns and synchronises the development of 
individual sub-systems to develop a larger system whose functionality is greater than the sum of its 
parts.” (Rebovich, 2008) He then goes on to describe how this approach does not lend itself to systems 
that are not built from scratch and rely on ‘overlay’ over existing systems and practises. This is certainly 
in-line with most railway applications. 
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What he then defines as Enterprise Systems Engineering is the requirement to have interactions with 
systems owned by different organisations. This is a new discipline of systems engineering and again very 
relevant to the railway industry, where the infrastructure is generally owned and operated by 
Infrastructure Managers (IMs), while the rolling stock is generally operated and maintained by Railway 
Undertakings (RUs). The paper goes on to discuss some of the challenges of implementing such systems, 
using the development of the banking ATM system as an example, ending with the conclusion that part 
of Enterprise Systems Engineering scope should be to identify technology trends and manage the 
interactions between different organisations. This will be a key issue in the development of any system 
engineering models for the railway industry, with its large number of multiple stakeholders. 
A later paper (Boxer, et al., 2008) expands on the concepts of how to deal with multiple organisations by 
proposing four layers of ‘interoperability’ when describing how machines are used by organisations: 
 Layer 4: Organisational Interoperability (shared understanding of organisational processes) 
 Layer 3: Semantic Interoperability (shared understanding of meaning) 
 Layer 2: Syntactic Interoperability (language syntax) 
 Layer 1: Machine Level Interoperability (lexis) 
(Boxer, et al., 2008) 
This is useful for understanding how multiple organisations such as IMs and RUs will have to interact. 
Another paper (Lewis, et al., 2008) offers an alternative view that looks at a proposed Systems of 
Systems lifecycle and how Systems Of Systems (SOS) can be shown on simple diagrams of Collaboration 
against Response. Though it is not clear how these could relate to the application of Train Control 
Systems, the paper also provides an excellent diagram on the overview of what it calls Capabilities 
Engineering, showing how it can be used to gather end user needs and develop them into system 
requirements. 
Another view is presented in a paper (Clark, 2008) that examines how to derive a model for a System of 
Systems (or “Family Of Systems (FOS)” (Clark, 2008) as the author calls them) based around the 
traditional systems engineering V-cycle and block diagrams. This method is to have a top-level block 
diagram representing the full system and then have a series of nested block diagrams to represent each 
sub-system. Each of these nested sub-systems has an associated V-cycle of their own, which in turn 
feed-up to an overall V-cycle. 
Although this approach seems fairly simple, it could potentially lead to extremely complex diagrams for 
systems made up of large numbers of sub-systems. 
A simpler model is shown in another paper (Yoon, et al., 2008) in which the authors use the 
ISO/IEC15288:2002 system life cycle model to derive a “hierarchical structure of a system-of-interest” 
(Yoon, et al., 2008), which can in turn be mapped onto a single V-model. 
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2.2 Railway Systems 
In a paper produced as part of the Railway Signalling and Control Systems Professional Development 
Course for the IET in 2010 (Booth, 2010), the author details the history and development of train 
protection for fixed block systems and how it evolved into ATP. 
He then discusses the differences between intermittent and continuous ATP before exploring the 
development of in-cab signalling, which leads on to the development of ERTMS/ETCS. This is an 
excellent paper on the history of train protection systems and the basics of ERTMS. 
Another paper (Peng, 2011) provides a very good overview of CBTC systems, detailing how they are 
utilised to automate train movements yet still provide a safe method of operation. 
A recent interesting paper (Hossein, et al., 2015) looks at the original development of the UK railway 
network in the 19th Century and how it evolved into a complex SOS built and run by numerous private 
companies. It then goes on to talk about the nationalisation and later privatisation of the network and 
what impact this had on the system. The paper then discusses the modern railway as a System of 
Systems (though points out that technically it has always been such).  It then compares the system to 
the US Department of Defence SOS Classification and concludes that the UK rail network “started as an 
accidental SOS and has moved to being a collaborative SOS” (Hossein, et al., 2015). The paper then 
further examines the system in terms of the UK MoD System of System Approach (SOSA) which consists 
of 9 principles split across three categories: 
Coherence: 
P1. Unifying the [Defence] Enterprise. 
P2. Driving Business and Operational Effectiveness. 
P3. Minimising Diversity.  
Reuse: 
P4. Designing for Reuse. 
P5. Building with Proven Solutions. 
P6. Ensuring Commonality of Services across the Enterprise. 
Interoperability: 
P7. Designing for Flexible Interoperability. 
P8. Adopting Open Standards. 
P9. Treating Planning, Design and Configuration Information as an Asset. 
(Hossein, et al., 2015) 
It concludes that from its development from the 18th to the 21st Century, the UK railway can be 
considered a complex System of Systems, some of which has evolved and some of which has been 
inherited. 
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2.3 Systems Engineering for Railways 
One of the most important aspects of this research will be how Systems Engineering can best be utilised 
within the railway industry in order to deliver the best possible train control system efficiently. This 
Section therefore looks at several papers that have investigated this subject. 
A paper presented by Schmid at the IRSE technical meeting in 2002 (Schmid, 2002) looked at the 
development and future of train control systems. It discusses a 'jigsaw' model of train control systems, 
showing how all the important elements of the system interact together and talks about research being 
undertaken to improve Network and Capacity Management, Dependability of Railway Systems & Train 
Control and Signalling (Safety Layer). One of its key discussions is the importance of how the safety layer 
fits into a train control system as well as the layers of development required to build up a train control 
system. It goes on to look at the requirements of the radio system and the importance of education 
within the railway industry of both operational and engineering requirements. It concludes with an 
analysis of the future requirements for academic railway research. 
A paper produced in 2013 (Beckford & Dora, 2013) imagines what the railway may look like in the 
future. It first looks at the history of the railway in Britain and how it has gradually been developed 
through an almost reactive process following serious incidents, though the current operation has not 
changed fundamentally since 1950. It also discusses the issue that ‘sub-systems’ have traditionally 
worked in ‘silos’ with as limited interaction with each other as possible. It then goes on to show how this 
must change to a systems-based approach as the industry faces greater integration of technology that 
traditionally crosses different discipline boundaries. It also looks at several examples, including traffic 
management, of how this systematic approach will be required in order to deliver a vision of how the 
railway must operate in the future in order to deliver the level of capacity required. 
A paper published in issue 202 of IRSE news (Mohan, 2014) considers the options for future methods of 
detecting train positions, some based on wayside detection, others using satellites and some using radio 
communications systems. What is common across all the options shown is that they require elements 
that make up a much larger system. 
Issue 204 of IRSE News contains an article (Free & Marshall, 2014) that looks into the proposed project 
to ‘resignal’ the Great Western main line in the UK. This large project will not only require the existing 
Class B ATP system to be upgraded to ETCS (the first upgrade of its kind in the UK) but will also involve 
the upgrade of the entire line to overhead electrical power line pantographs. In order to deliver such a 
large comprehensive programme, it is clear that a systematic approach will be required to control and 
manage the scope of the changes. Another article in issue 205 of IRSE News (Noffsinger, 2014) looks at 
the same issues in relation to the upgrade of the present protection systems in the USA to PTC. 
An interesting article was found on the Carnegie Mellon University website (Firesmith, 2013) which 
examined the use of multiple V-models as well as dual and tri V-models for software engineering 
verification & validation. These models were developed to assist with the issue of how testers of 
software often had multiple types of requirements, some part of the generic software and other 
particular to specific applications. This is very much the same paradox faced by developers and testers 
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of railway control and safety systems so a similar approach could potentially be used to manage the 
development and delivery of railway system projects. However, the embedded nature of the diagrams 
proposed may not be appropriate to the railways environment, where different organisations 
potentially perform different tasks, so something more sequential may be required. 
2.4 History of the Development of RCS Systems 
Modern railways are complex integrated SOS (Hossein, et al., 2015) that have evolved over many years 
out of the primitive mining installations of the 17th century. Until the 1970s, train consists were 
controlled by drivers and the infrastructure was managed by signallers, generally responsible for 
relatively small parts of the network. Drivers and controllers of today's mainline networks benefit from 
much better technology, while modern integrated metro systems are almost fully automated and often 
utilise wireless communications. Human interactions are limited and large networks are managed by 
control centres, with a level of automation. 
However, the development of these integrated systems has not always followed a well-structured path, 
with differing and potentially incompatible solutions being developed in isolation by different 
stakeholders of the overall system. A lack of international standards in the field of railway control 
systems has led to potential confusion in relation to the terminology used to describe these systems, 
with similar terms and acronyms having different meanings for different members of the railway 
community. 
The story of the development of railway control systems within the railway industry is very much the 
story of the development of the railway itself. Although the fundamental requirements placed on the 
industry have always remained the same, i.e. to move large numbers of passengers and goods safely and 
efficiently between different locations, what have evolved over the years are the requirements for 
higher levels of safety and maximizing the capacity available on networks. This has resulted in the 
evolution of railway control systems which enable more trains to be operated more efficiently on lines 
with enhanced safety. They allow railways to deliver faster, more frequent and safer services for 
customers and staff. 
2.4.1 Development of Railways 
Railways were born out of the use of guided carts utilised in the 17th Century to transport product out 
of mines (Lewis, 2001). This technology was eventually re-imagined for more general use in transporting 
people and goods, becoming the first commercial tram roads. These early tram roads of the 17th and 
18th centuries, whether powered by gravity, animals or people, operated by line of sight at low speed. 
When faster and more powerful steam traction was introduced for what became known as railways, it 
was initially considered acceptable practice to ensure safe separation of trains by timing the departure 
of trains into sections of tracks. This meant that there were no fixed indications or method for notifying 
the driver of a train of the status of the line ahead. Generally, trains were dispatched from a fixed point 
(such as a station), then allowed to travel for a fixed length of time before the following train was 
permitted to proceed. The timing was ensured by so-called railway policemen (May, 2000). 
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Fig.  2-1 Time-delayed Separation 
Since there was no form of communication with the driver of the first train, there were serious safety 
issues if a train was forced to slow down or stop before reaching its next waypoint as the following train 
had no way of knowing that it could not reach its next designated stop before encountering the train in 
front. This inevitably led to several tragic collisions as the railways grew in size, speed of operation and 
service intensity (Colburn, 2013).  
2.4.2 Development of Signalling 
In order to ensure the safe separation of trains, the concept of ‘block working’ was introduced, where 
the railway line was divided into sections to be used by one train at a time. This approach utilised fixed 
location signals, with mechanical arms, coloured balls and colour lights to indicate to the driver whether 
to stop or proceed. Initially, the operation of these signals was entirely manual, based on the 
observation of the passing trains and their tail-lights, on the exchange of tokens and the use of the 
telegraph, negotiating the passage of trains from one ‘block’ to the next by Morse code or bell-codes 
(Colburn, 2013). The introduction of electric track circuits associated with each block section both 
increased the level of safety and allowed a limited level of automation (Colburn, 2013). They allowed the 
remote detection of the location of trains. The electric circuits would be connected to signals protecting 
the sections. When trains entered a block section, they would short out the track circuit and cause the 
preceding signal to change to the stop indication, so that drivers of following trains would know the 
section was occupied and would stop their trains in good time. 
 
 
 
Train travels for a fixed period of time 
 
  
 
 
 
Following train is then permitted to proceed 
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Fig.  2-2 Block Separated Signalling 
Although this significantly reduced the risk of collisions between trains following each other on plain 
line, there was still a danger of collision at points and crossings where conflicting routes could be set 
and, hence, opposing trains might be running on the same track. In order to overcome this problem, the 
levers used to control the points, at that time often located in local signal boxes, were interconnected so 
that when a route was set by one lever, the other levers were locked mechanically, preventing 
conflicting routes from being set. This approach became known as interlocking. 
Modern fixed block signalling systems still adhere to these fundamental principles, although they may 
use more complicated audio-frequency track circuits or axle counters for the train detection, as well as 
modern interlocking systems that are based on safety critical electronic hardware with in-built 
redundancy and validated software to ensure safety. 
2.4.3 Development of Train Protection 
Even though the introduction of block working with lineside signals had greatly reduced the number of 
collisions that occurred on the railway, the system was limited in that it required the driver to 
acknowledge the signal aspect and then act as required by the command. This was not always the case 
with drivers missing signals due to distraction, illness or poor visibility. Although rare, such incidents 
resulted in a number of very severe collisions, e.g., the Southall accident in Britain in 1997. The concept 
of automatic train protection emerged as a consequence of these incidents, where an additional safety 
system is overlaid on the signal indication that prevents the train from passing the signal if it is set at 
danger. In its simplest form, this was achieved by fitting a lever known as a tripcock to the undercarriage 
of the trains, which applied the emergency brake when activated. A device known as a trainstop was 
installed next to the signal, which raised a mechanical arm to activate the tripcock if the signal was set to 
danger. The mechanical interface is replaced with magnetic and inductive methods of activation in 
newer versions of trainstop systems. However, to protect trains fully, this type of system requires a clear 
space beyond the signal that is as long as a full braking distance, from line speed. Typical examples are 
the German Indusi, the Spanish Anuncio de Señales y Frenado Automático (ASFA) and the Swiss Signum 
systems. 
Signals are connected to proceeding block sections 
Signal will only show proceed aspect when all its blocks are unoccupied 
Track is divided into block sections that detect train occupancy 
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Modern forms of train protection all work on the same basic principle of stopping a train before a 
danger point, but utilise various methods, often based around wireless communication, either to stop 
the train as quickly as possible or to slow it down gradually. Most of the modern systems supervise the 
train’s speed continuously and also often first give an audio and / or visual indication to the driver 
before intervening. In some regions, the ATP functionality is referred to as Automatic Train Control 
(ATC). 
An example absolute ATP system that stops the train immediately if it passes a signal set at danger is 
shown in Fig 2-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  2-3 Example Absolute Automatic Train Protection System 
2.4.4 Development of Automation 
As technology has developed, it has become possible to automate many further aspects of the 
operation of the railway, including the routing of trains and even the control of the movement of trains. 
Unlike many earlier enhancements of the railway system, these new developments do not usually 
provide any safety benefits, but are instead intended to improve the efficiency of the railway and to 
increase the capacity of the network. 
2.4.4.1 Route Automation 
Today, the routing of trains is often handled by centralized control centres that utilise computer systems 
to enable operators to set routes for entire lines. These systems provide no direct safety functionality, 
but can be used to control vast areas of a railway or a complete metro network, e.g., BNSF’s Network 
Operations Centre at Fort Worth in Texas, which controls nearly 35,000 miles of railway across the 
entire USA (BNSF, n.d.) or London Underground’s new Control Centre at Northumberland Park, which 
now controls the entire Victoria Line (TfL, 2015). Developments have also been made on producing 
 
 
 
Switchable indicator is 
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If driver attempts to pass 
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indicator tells the train 
to intervene  
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computer systems for these control centres that automate key functions such as the routing of the 
trains based on the timetable or schedule. 
2.4.4.2 Train Automation 
One of the most significant advancements in the development of metro systems in recent years has 
been that of Automatic Train Operation (ATO), where trains are no longer controlled by a driver but 
drive themselves between designated stopping points, usually stations. ATO is actually quite a simple 
system, as it only requires four inputs and acts on two outputs. The system merely needs to know: 
 The timetable 
 The aspect of the next signal 
 The position of the train 
 The train’s current speed 
The last two of which are both available from the odometer, though this does not provide the greatest 
level of position accuracy on its own and some form of error correction (usually through the use of fixed-
position reference beacons throughout the track) is also required. 
From these inputs, the ATO can calculate what speed profile the train must adopt in order to reach its 
next stopping point at the correct time. It therefore needs to have outputs to: 
 The train’s traction 
 The train’s braking systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  2-4 Basic ATO Functionality 
Since the ATO is only responsible for moving the train to its next stopping point, it is not designed to a 
safety critical standard and, therefore, ATO must always be used with Automatic Train Protection (ATP). 
The combination of these two elements is known as Automatic Train Control (ATC) in Europe. 
Train receives location of its next stopping point 
 
Platform 
Train controls braking & 
motoring and works out its 
location using an onboard 
map & tachometry. 
Position references are provided in the trackside for the train 
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Standard EN 62290-1:2006 (BSI, 2013) has defined five main Grades Of Automation (GOA) for train 
control, as per Table 2-1: 
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Table 2-1 Grades of Automation (BSI, 2013) 
Permission to reproduce extracts from BS EN 62290-1:2006 is granted by BSI.  British Standards can be obtained in PDF or hard copy formats 
from the BSI online shop: www.bsigroup.com/Shop or by contacting BSI Customer Services for hardcopies only: Tel: +44 (0)20 8996 9001, Email: 
cservices@bsigroup.com.
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2.5 Modern Systems 
Modern RCS systems can generally be divided into two types, namely, those utilised on 
mainline railways and those used on metro networks. Most modern systems rely on some 
form of radio or inductive transmission of data from the infrastructure to the train and vice 
versa. 
2.5.1 Mainline Systems 
There are two main systems of radio based train control currently being implemented on 
mainline operations throughout the world: ERTMS and PTC. 
ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) is the European Union’s initiative to 
standardize all forms of train operation within Europe. It consists of three main parts: 
 Global System for Mobile communications – Railways (GSM-R), which is a standard 
communications system 
 European Traffic Management Layer (ETML), which will standardize traffic 
management operations 
 European Train Control System (ETCS), which will provide standard train protection 
for Europe. 
ETCS utilises wireless communication to provide in-cab signalling and can be implemented in 
one of three main levels as defined by the Union des Industries Ferroviaires Européennes 
(UNIFE): 
 Level 1 acts as an overlay for existing conventional schemes and utilises radio 
beacons known as balises embedded in the 4-foot connected to the interlocking via 
a Lineside Equipment Unit (LEU). These balises transmit the permitted MA to the 
train as it passes over them 
 Level 2 utilises the GSM-R system to continuously transmit the MA to the train via a 
Radio Block Centre (RBC) which is connected to the interlocking, meaning that there 
is no longer a need for lineside signals. Balises are still used but now act as 
autonomous position references only 
 Level 3 is a conceptual level where conventional forms of train detection (such as 
axle counters or track circuits) are removed and the train maintains its own integrity, 
allowing the train to run on moving block 
(UNIFE, 2013) 
The Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) is very similar to the ETCS system (Ning, et al., 
2004) but with the levels defined slightly differently as shown in Table 2-1. 
CTCS Level Equivalent ETCS Level 
1 Local Protection System 
2 1 
3 2 
4 3 
Table 2-2 Equivalent CTCS & ETCS Levels 
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As CTCS architecture is therefore almost identical to ETCS architecture, it will not be 
considered separately as part of this research. 
PTC (Positive Train Control) is the standard developed in North America as their new in-cab 
signalling standard. It is based around four main objectives set by the USA Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) (FRA, 2008): 
 Train separation or collision avoidance  
 Line speed enforcement  
 Temporary speed restrictions  
 Rail worker wayside safety 
(FRA, 2008) 
There are currently five types of system that have been defined as PTC by the FRA (FRA, 
2008) and the definitions are quoted below: 
 ACSES (Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System). 
o A transponder-based system, in use on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor (Type 
Approved and Certified by FRA.) 
 ETMS (Electronic Train Management System). 
o A GPS and communications-based system being deployed by BNSF Railway. 
(Type Approved and Certified by FRA for restricted use.) 
 I-ETMS (formerly called Vital Electronic Train Management System). 
o A GPS and communications-based system, not yet ready for deployment. 
(Type Approved by FRA.) 
 ITCS (Incremental Train Control System). 
o A GPS and communications-based system used by Amtrak on its Michigan 
line 
o Authorized for passenger train speeds up to 110 mph, originally put into use 
by the specific requirements of an FRA-approved waiver. 
o ITCS certification through Amtrak's request for expedited certification 
process is pending successful resolution of a few remaining issues prior to 
FRA approval for certification. 
 Enhanced Automatic Train Control (E-ATC). 
o A system that uses an underlying automatic train control (ATC) system, in 
conjunction with other “enhanced” features or systems to achieve the core 
required functionalities of PTC. 
o These systems are often integrated with underlying cab signal systems (CSS) 
and centralized traffic control (CTC) systems, in addition to other signal or 
train control system enhancements the railroad elects to make, to meet the 
full requirements of PTC. 
(FRA, 2008) 
These systems are discussed in greater detail in Sections 1.7.3 and 1.7.4. 
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2.5.2 Metro Systems 
Modern metro networks utilise systems known as Communications Based Train Control 
(CBTC), with Communications referring to some form of wireless communication that is 
utilised to transmit authority to the train to proceed; though sometimes CBTC is defined as 
Computer Based Train Control due to the fact that it relies heavily on computer-based 
processing. 
CBTC generally combines Automatic Train Control (ATC) that consists of Automatic Train 
Protection (ATP) and Automatic Train Operation (ATO), with another function known as 
Automatic Train Supervision (ATS). These functions are defined in more detail in Section 
1.7.2. 
CBTC can also utilise some form of continuous train detection, whether by means of current 
loops or balises and odometers, which enable a central system connected to the interlocking 
to know the position of every train on the network accurately and thus allow trains to run 
closer to each other than is possible with fixed block separation. This method of control, 
where trains are separated by a braking distance and a safety gap, is known as moving block. 
These systems are discussed in greater detail in Sections 1.7.3 and 1.7.4. 
2.6 System Modelling Tools 
There are a large number of software tools that can be utilised to model complex systems 
and even complex SOS. The majority of these tools have been designed for other industries 
or as a generic tool that can be applied to any industry. However, some tools have been 
developed especially for the railway industry. 
A recent MSc thesis by an employee of Thales (Farrell, 2015) investigated if the use of 
modelling and simulation of external systems and their interface to CBTC would reduce risks 
to CBTC’s implementation on projects such as the 4 Lines Modernisation Programme 
currently taking place on London Underground (LU). The author concluded that: 
The use of modelling and simulation can be used at the design stage using an 
existing simulation tool, and at the early implementation stage using a proven 
concept simulation tool, and would reduce risk. Risks were determined to be to 
people involved in testing activities and also those associated with the cost of 
rework following design error. He also concluded that there were commercial 
benefits both in terms of monetary savings from reduced resources and equipment 
needed to undertake testing activities and also intangible benefits, such as 
enhanced reputation through the use of innovative approaches to testing. (Farrell, 
2015) 
The 2012 Railway Technical Strategy (RTS) (RSSB, 2012), which defines the UK’s future vision 
for the railway industry, has technology at its core and a recent study (Sharpe, et al., 2015) 
investigated how the strategy’s vision could be applied to a current major network upgrade, 
namely the capacity improvements programme between Woking and Waterloo. The study 
promoted the use of systems thinking and modelling tools to monitor and control the 
complex interdependent requirements of the programme. 
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A recent paper (Li & Zhang, 2015) investigated the benefits of modelling a modern CBTC 
system using Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL) in the development and 
delivery of such systems, whilst another paper (Hossein, et al., 2015) utilised various 
abstract models to simulate the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in California. They 
showed how this effectively enabled systems to be tested prior to building in order to limit 
the risks of malfunctions on implementation. 
2.7 Resilience Engineering 
A recent white paper produced for the aviation industry (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) discusses 
the importance of Resilience Engineering to Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems. These 
systems have many similar challenges to RCS systems, so this approach could be a useful 
analysis tool to examine the appropriateness of these proposed RCS models and how they 
should be utilised for developing and delivering RCS systems. 
Leonhardt et al define Resilience Engineering as, “The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust 
its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions.” (Leonhardt, et al., 
2009) 
They go on to explain that: 
Since humans are indispensable in all situations involving change, Resilience 
Engineering naturally has strong links with Human Factors and Safety Management. 
It is based on the following premises: 
1. Performance conditions are always underspecified. Individuals and 
organisations must therefore adjust what they do to match current 
demands and resources. Because resources and time are finite, such 
adjustments will inevitably be approximate. 
2. Some adverse events can be attributed to a breakdown or malfunctioning of 
components and normal system functions, but others cannot. The latter can 
best be understood as the result of unexpected combinations of 
performance variability. 
3. Safety management cannot be based exclusively on hindsight, nor rely on 
error tabulation and the calculation of failure probabilities. Safety 
management must be proactive as well as reactive. 
4. Safety cannot be isolated from the core (business) process, nor vice versa. 
Safety is the prerequisite for productivity, and productivity is the 
prerequisite for safety. Safety must therefore be achieved by improvements 
rather than by constraints. 
Adopting this view creates a need for an approach that can represent the variability 
of normal system performance, and for methods that can use this to provide more 
comprehensive explanations of accidents as well as identify potential risks.  
(Leonhardt, et al., 2009) 
In comparison to traditional risk analysis and safety management, the authors state that, 
“Resilience engineering is not only to prevent things from going wrong, but also to ensure 
that things go right, i.e., to ensure normal outcomes.” (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) 
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Leonhardt et al demonstrate this concept on a diagram where, “The x-axis describes 
predictability, ranging from very low to very high, and the y-axis describes the value of the 
outcome, ranging from negative to positive” (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) as shown in Fig.  2-5. 
 
Fig.  2-5 Resilience Engineering set of possible outcomes (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) 
The authors go on to talk about the importance of performance variability in resilience 
engineering. This is the study of how the performance of systems is bound to vary 
significantly due to a number of factors as demonstrated in Fig.  2-6. 
 
Fig.  2-6 Safety Focus anno 2009 (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) 
The authors then introduce the concept of upstream-downstream and the importance of its 
integration into a company’s business. They state that, “There are dependencies to what 
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went before (upstream) and what comes after (downstream) in any particular process at a 
given point in time.” (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) There is also a very good analogy of how 
situations can develop from multiple flaws in the system, which it calls the ‘Swiss Cheese’ 
Model. This basically shows how situations do not usually develop from one big flaw but 
from a number of small flaws (in other words the holes of the cheese) all lining up at the 
same time:  
 
Fig.  2-7 ‘Swiss Cheese’ Model (Leonhardt, et al., 2009) 
This approach of resilience engineering has been demonstrated for use on the railway by 
(Collis, et al., 2013), who applied it retrospectively to an incident that occurred on the 
Channel Tunnel in 2009, when bad weather caused the failure of several trains. The incident 
resulted in the pile-up of several trains that required rescuing. The paper examines the 
response of the operator, who seems to have been unprepared for such an incident. One of 
the key aspects that the paper raises is the importance of anticipation and planning of 
events. The paper re-iterates one of the key aspects of resilience engineering: that it is not 
only identifying potential issues that could affect a system, but also determining how to 
prevent them. 
This approach can be applied to the RCS system models to show how they are important to 
the development of a RCS system and how they can be utilised to control and prevent risk in 
the programme development. 
As stated previously, the key to the operation of a RCS system is accurate end-to-end 
communication of safety critical information between two key personnel (the Line 
Controller and the Train Operator). It is vital that the upstream and downstream of this data 
is maintained under all possible scenarios. We utilise the Safety & Protection layer as 
defined in the functional model to ensure that this is the case. However, as the system is 
developed and migrated, there is significant risk of loss in integrity if the system is not 
developed or implemented correctly. It is therefore essential that change control is 
monitored and controlled carefully as the system is developed and that these changes are 
implemented correctly when the system is installed onsite. 
Therefore, I would say that there are two fundamental issues that we should constantly 
consider in the development of any RCS system: 
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1. Maintain the integrity of both the new system and any existing system during 
development and migration 
2. When the system is in operation, the integrity of the safety-critical data must be 
maintained at all times 
Both of these items can be ensured through using appropriate systems engineering tools 
such as: 
 Requirements Management 
 Interface Management 
 Configuration Management 
2.8 Current RCS Systems Design and Delivery 
The development and delivery of modern RCS systems varies greatly depending on the type 
of RCS system and where it is deployed in the world, as different countries have different 
standards. However, they can be broadly grouped into the four categories that shall be 
defined in Section 1.7. 
2.8.1 Conventional Signalling 
There have been several papers produced into the developments and applications of 
conventional signalling technology as it continues to be widely utilised worldwide. Some of 
the best examples are described in this Section. 
A recent paper by P. Booth for the Railway Signalling and Control Systems Professional 
Development Course provided by the Institution of Engineering and Technology in June 2010 
(Booth, 2010) defines the basics of train protection for mainline railways and explains how 
conventional signalling is designed in the UK. 
Another recent paper by Wang & Goverde (Wang & Goverde, 2016) investigates how to 
optimise the train trajectory of conventional signalling systems, particularly in relation to the 
ATP. It also explores how the performance can be further improved by the introduction of 
Driver Advisory Systems (DAS). 
Recent research (Wang, et al., 2016) makes the point that even conventional signalling 
consists of sub-systems such as ATP, CBI and centralised control, all of which are themselves 
self-disciplined control systems. The paper talks about the different requirements on the 
design of the safety critical systems such as ATP and CBI which typically have a Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) (IEC, 2010) rating of 4, whilst the less safety-critical centralised control 
systems are generally SIL0-2. 
2.8.2 CBTC 
There have been several papers that have looked into the developments and applications of 
CBTC technology for use on predominantly metro systems. Some of the best examples are 
described in this Section. 
A paper published by Yelloz in 2012 (Yelloz, 2011) describes the development and 
implementation of the Siemens CBTC system that was installed on Line 9 of the Barcelona 
Metro as the first driverless train in Spain. The paper gives an excellent example of how the 
requirements of the implemented system were derived from the unique operational 
environment of the Barcelona Metro and how they adapted their experiences on the Paris 
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Metro to this system. The paper goes on to explain how it derived General, Functional and 
Availability requirements, as well as Degraded Modes and Maintenance requirements.  It 
then explains how the Siemens system meets these requirements and how the functionality 
is divided between the On-board and Wayside equipment. It also outlines the 
communications system and Automatic Train Supervision capabilities before detailing the 
benefits the new system brings to passengers and operators. It is interesting to note that 
these benefits do not always relate directly to the identified requirements. What this paper 
does not discuss is what methods were used to ensure that all requirements were met or 
how the generic products were adapted to the specific application of the Barcelona Metro. 
Another paper published by Oh. et al in 2013 (Oh, et al., 2013) discusses how Korea has 
developed its Korean Radio-based Train Control System (KRTCS) as its standard for CBTC. 
The paper details the system’s functionality from a generic point of view, independent of 
any specific application. It presents a good high level view of the architecture and how its 
functionality works, particularly in the interactions between the wayside and on-board 
systems. It does not go into any details of how the system’s functionality relates to industry 
needs nor how it can be applied to specific applications. 
A recent paper from Ferrai et al in 2014 (Ferrai, et al., 2014) investigates the issues for 
standardising CBTC specifications. It provides a very good description of both Fixed Block 
and Moving Block operation and an excellent high level overview of various CBTC 
architectures, before going on to develop a global feature diagram showing common 
elements of CBTC systems in simplified tree diagram. It then shows how this can be derived 
into example sequence diagrams for train moves for specific technologies. It also shows 
traceability of how functionality can be derived from the standards (but not from business 
needs or requirements) and then goes onto scenarios to develop appropriate architecture. 
A different take on this is provided in a paper from Siemens (Schmelzer, 2010), which looks 
at potentially utilising the ETCS standards to standardise CBTC development. It particularly 
relates to the Siemens CBTC system, which utilises switchable balises in a similar way to 
ETCS, enabling quite a direct comparison. It goes on to explain the difference between 
continuous ATC utilising CBTC standards and intermittent ATC using ETCS standards. Its main 
analysis is on how standardising CBTC with ETCS could be utilised to improve mixed traffic 
operation, but it does not show how such a system would be developed and applied to a 
specific application. 
A final paper produced by Hitachi (Tazaki, et al., 2012) explores how their CBTC system 
(previously only utilised in Japan) was developed for Chongqing in China. Though it gives a 
brief overview of how the system was developed for global markets, it does not go into 
great detail about how the system was developed, nor how it is applied to the specific 
applications. 
2.8.3 ERTMS 
Since ERTMS was developed as the standard solution for train control within Europe, there 
have been many papers written on it. Some of the best examples which investigate the 
development and implementation of its architecture are provided in this Section. 
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A paper produced by the French Institute of Sciences and Technology for Transport (Ghazel, 
2014) gives a very good overview of the entire ERTMS system, including its current level of 
deployment and basic levels of operation. It then goes on to discuss the challenges it 
introduces in its development and deployment, particularly the management of transitions 
and demonstrates the use of UML to depict this pictorially. However, it does not investigate 
the process for developing and delivering the ERTMS system either generically or for specific 
applications. 
Another paper (Qiu, et al., 2014) further shows how railways can be modelled using state 
charts and investigates how these charts can be applied to ERTMS systems in order to 
determine the availability that the system will bring to a particular railway. It then utilises 
ETCS Level 2 to show how the system is broken down at a high level and the interactions of 
the main sub-systems. Again, it does not investigate how the system will be developed or 
implemented. 
An article (Smith, et al., 2012) looks into the lessons learnt from the implementations of 
ERTMS that have taken place so far. It provides an excellent detailed diagram of the ERTMS 
architecture as well as a good overview of the known Class B systems within Europe. It then 
goes on to talk about the amount of ERTMS deployed across Europe and some of the 
mistakes made. It mainly details problems with operational procedures and issues with 
human factors in relation to the drivers’ interactions to the system. It could be inferred from 
this that there has not been correct gathering of end-user requirements and a general lack 
of systems engineering during the development and implementation of these projects. 
Another paper (Cimatti, et al., 2012) conducts an excellent investigation into the validation 
of requirements for safety critical systems using ETCS as an example. It utilises a graphical 
approach based on UML to examine ETCS in terms of hybrid evolution. It then proposes a 
long and quite complex process based around informal analysis, formal analysis, 
formalisation and formal validation to prove requirements are met by an implemented 
system. The output is a new language called OTHELLO, which is expressive enough to 
represent various domains of interest, yet allows efficient procedures for checking. A 
limitation of this paper is that it only looks at the software elements of ETCS and does not 
explore its implementation in a specific application. 
A final paper (Thompson, et al., 2012) carried out an ergonomics study into the implications 
of the fitment of ETCS to existing UK rolling stock. It pays particular attention to the human 
factors issues of the integration of the current class B systems (TPWS & AWS) with the ETCS 
DMI in the cab. It examines this in a desktop environment, utilising simulation and cab 
mock-ups to determine the main issues the end users will face. The paper looks into the 
potential implications of these fitments on real rolling stock and how they can be achieved, 
but does not investigate how the on-board system fits into the complete ERTMS system. 
2.8.4 PTC 
The challenges of implementing PTC are very similar to those of ERTMS but with the added 
complication that there are numerous variations of the ‘system’. 
  
52 
 
This was particularly highlighted in a paper produced for IRSE news (Noffsinger, 2014) where 
the author goes into detail about the whole programme. The paper starts with the history of 
PTC, including how the FRA first began rulemaking proceedings in the late 1990s to set 
technical standards for electronic systems on railways; a debate that became moot after the 
high profile collision in Chatsworth, California in July 2008 with 25 fatalities and 100 injured. 
Directed by Congress to override the cost/benefit test, FRA set about developing and issuing 
regulations requiring railways to implement and commission PTC by the statutory deadline 
of 31 December 2015. 
The paper (Noffsinger, 2014) goes on to define the four core requirements of PTC as defined 
in Section 1.7.4 before looking at the scope of the required programme to fit the entire USA 
network, including the challenges of: 
 Upgrading the communications infrastructure 
 Modifying the existing railway infrastructure and signalling 
 Achieving approval through the regulation process 
 The different types of PTC (as defined in Section 1.7.4) 
(Noffsinger, 2014) 
The paper (Noffsinger, 2014) concludes how the challenges made it unlikely that any railroad 
would meet the 31 December 2015 deadline for PTC implementation, a fact acknowledged 
by the FRA, who provided some leeway in PTC Final Rule in August 2014 on the 
implementation targets. This temporary relief provision expires on 31 December 2017, 
which provides some flexibility for a two-year period. 
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3. System Development & Delivery of RCS Systems 
In terms of fundamental system engineering, (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) define 
four recognised main stages of the systems engineering lifecycle as: 
 Pre-acquisition 
 Acquisition 
 Utilisation 
 Retirement 
This research predominantly covers the Acquisition and Utilisation phases of RCS 
projects.  Faulconbridge & Ryan describe the breakdown of this as shown in Fig.  3-1.  
(King, 2016) 
 
Fig.  3-1 Activities in the Acquisition and Utilisation Phases of the system lifecycle (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) 
The main activities associated with the Acquisition Phase and their associated major 
milestones and outputs are defined by (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) as shown in Fig.  
3-2. (King, 2016)  
 
Fig.  3-2 Acquisition Phase activities and the major artefacts and reviews associated with each (Faulconbridge 
& Ryan, 2014)  
There are a number of systems engineering models that have been developed to 
manage the development and delivery of systems from Acquisition to Utilisation. The 
most popular is the V-lifecycle model, which was originally developed for software 
systems but has been adapted over time for complex multi-disciplinary systems 
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011) including RCS systems. 
Although the V-lifecycle model is starting to be used extensively throughout the 
railway industry for both the development and deployment of RCS, there is 
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considerable confusion about how it should be applied and even what it is 
fundamentally being used for (Sharpe, et al., 2015). One of the issues is that there is 
not so much a ‘standard’ V-lifecycle model for all forms of systems, so there are 
multiple V-models that are used for different types of systems. 
(Bruegge & Dutoiyt, 2010) defines the original V-lifecycle model as being developed 
for Software Engineering from the waterfall model to incorporate feedback and 
ensure defined requirements are met by software code. This model is now generally 
utilised for most forms of product development. (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011) show 
how this model has been developed by INCOSE to manage the requirements of large 
complex systems such as aviation and industrial control systems. 
Further complications arise from a lack of understanding within the railway industry 
of the difference between Generic Systems and Specific Applications. These will 
therefore be defined in the following Sections of this Chapter. (King, 2016) 
3.1 Generic System 
Suppliers of RCS technology tend to develop Generic systems based on global market 
requirements from the industry. This enables them to develop adaptable systems 
that can be sold to different local markets throughout the world (Bourne & Clark, 
2007). To develop these systems, they tend to follow a V-lifecycle model very similar 
to the adapted waterfall model utilised for product development as shown in Fig.  
3-3. (King, 2016) 
 
Fig.  3-3 Typical Supplier V-Cycle for Developing RCS Systems (King, 2016) 
The supplier will take common needs that railways throughout the world have and 
use these to develop a system platform that will be made up of various sub-systems 
that will in turn be made up of hardware & software components. They will then 
develop the system to take to market. (King, 2016) 
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3.2 Specific Application 
Railway operators will generally have identified business needs for an RCS system 
and develop a Concept of Operations before going to market to identify a system 
that will meet these needs (Bourne & Clark, 2007). They will then follow a V-lifecycle 
model more akin to the INCOSE version of the V-lifecycle developed for complex 
systems as shown in Fig.  3-4. (King, 2016) 
 
Fig.  3-4 Typical V-Cycle for Delivering RCS System on a Specific Railway (King, 2016) 
The operator will contract the supplier to deliver the system to the concept of 
operations it has developed. The supplier will determine what functional 
requirements their generic system will need in order to deliver the operator’s needs, 
including specifics such as the geographic layout of the line and particulars of station 
interfaces. These will inevitably lead to required modifications to their sub-systems. 
They will then need to design the implementation of the system (scheme layout, etc.) 
which will in turn be simulated and factory tested to prove the concept before being 
installed and tested on site to be accepted for operation by the operator. (King, 2016) 
3.3 RCS System W-Model 
The development of the Generic System and Specific Application actually each tell 
half the story of the RCS system development. What is really needed is a ‘W-model’ 
showing all the stages and which entity is responsible for them. As part of this 
research, I have produced such a diagram and it is proposed in Fig.  3-5. (King, 2016) 
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Fig.  3-5 Proposed W-Cycle for Complete RCS Development & Implementation (Single Source Supplier) (King, 2016) 
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As can be seen in Fig.  3-5, the supplier will develop their generic system based on the 
industry’s needs as described in Section 3.1. 
When an operator identifies business needs for an RCS system as described in Section 
3.2, they will then produce a Concept of Operations (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014) 
that will define how the new system will function and the key human-machine 
interactions that will take place, both in terms of operations and maintenance. 
The Operator (or an Engineering Consultancy representing them) will then produce 
an output-specified Invitation To Tender (ITT) that will go out to suppliers to provide 
a system that meets their requirements. 
The suppliers will bid for this work proposing a system based on their generic systems 
that they developed using the process described in Section 3.1. 
The operator will choose the system most appropriate to their needs and then 
contract the relevant supplier to deliver this system to their specific requirements as 
shown in Section 3.2. 
Once the system has been accepted for operation, it will then enter the utilisation 
phase of Operations & Maintenance until the business needs require a new RCS 
system. At the same time, suppliers will be observing the utilisation of all railways to 
determine new innovations for their generic system development. 
(King, 2016) 
However, even this model can be somewhat over simplistic, as it makes the fundamental 
assumption that a single-source supplier shall be utilised for the complete system (i.e. the 
same supplier shall provide all sub-systems and integrate them into a complete system). This 
is becoming increasingly unlikely on many mainline networks, where separate development 
programmes are taking place for traffic management and train control technology in order 
to maximise competition within the supplier market. Therefore, an operator may want to 
purchase separate TMS, ATP and DAS systems and then integrate them into a complete 
system on their railway. In this case, there will be multiple generic system V-lifecycles that 
must be integrated in the specific application V-lifecycle as shown in Fig.  3-6. Here there a 
multiple research and development v-cycles being carried out by multiple suppliers to each 
develop a specific sub-system that must then be integrated by the operator into a complete 
system to deliver a safe operational railway. 
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Fig.  3-6 W-Cycle for Complete RCS Development & Implementation (Multiple Supplier Sub-systems)  
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4. RCS System Model (Generic System) 
This section shall expand upon the idea that it is possible to develop a generic model of a 
RCS system that works on the principles that all solutions must follow and therefore, any 
system can be mapped onto it. 
4.1 Functional Model 
If we take the systems model derived from conventional signalling in Fig.  1-4, then 
also consider that there can be feedback between each sub-system and that there is 
a direct (voice) communication between the operators, we can extrapolate a more 
generic model where we can see the requirements as functional layers (as opposed to 
physical sub-systems) as shown in Fig.  4-1. 
(King, 2016)  
 
Fig.  4-1 Generic RCS Functional Model (King, 2016) 
This model works on the basis of the following rules: 
• The Line Controller interfaces to the system through the Route Performance 
Layer ONLY 
• The Train Operator interfaces to the system through the Train Performance 
Layer ONLY 
• NO Operator directly interfaces to the Safety & Protection Layer 
• ALL Safety Critical functions including interlocking, train detection, train 
protection and points detection are handled in the Safety & Protection Layer 
ONLY 
• ALL Safety Critical communications MUST pass through the Safety & Protection 
Layer 
• The Non-vital Communications Path is for voice communications and indications 
ONLY (for example passenger announcements) 
(King, 2016) 
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4.2 Physical Model 
The functional model derived in Section 4.1 can potentially be mapped onto any form of 
system in order to derive its functional requirements. However, this could potentially be 
problematic for delivering the system, as equipment can be in different locations and assets 
spread across different stakeholder owners. 
It would therefore be useful to also consider a physical model that shows the locations of 
equipment across the main locales of the railway in order to deliver the system. This can be 
complex, as different railways (and the location requirements of different types of RCS and 
their associated sub-systems) can vary significantly in their geographic requirements. 
However, I have made a proposal based on my experience of various mainline, metro and 
mining railways throughout the world for a generic physical model of the main locations 
usually found on these railways, this is show in Fig.  4-2. 
 
Fig.  4-2 Generic RCS Physical Model 
The locations defined in the proposed physical model are: 
 Control Centre = The building/location from which the railway is controlled 
(equipment such as control system, traffic management system, etc. will usually be 
located here.) 
 Equipment Room = Room containing central-processing equipment located either 
on a station or on-site near track (equipment such as interlocking processor, radio 
block centre, axle counter evaluator, etc. are usually located in these sort of 
locations) 
 Trackside Area = On or near the track (equipment such as track circuits, axle counter 
heads, etc. will be located here) 
 Rolling Stock = The trains (equipment such as driver machine interface, European 
vital computer, etc. will be installed on the vehicles) 
The model shown in Fig.  4-2 is intended to be as flexible as possible so that it can be applied 
to any type of railway as required. In order to do this, it has been developed to show all the 
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possible (main) locations that could be required for railway operation. However, I 
acknowledge that certain railways and/or RCS systems may not utilise all the locations. For 
example, a small railway may only require a single central interlocking processor that could 
be located in the control centre and hence require no distributed equipment rooms along 
the route, or a mining railway using a PTC system as defined in Section 1.7.4 may require no 
trackside elements. If scenarios like these are the case, then the diagram can be easily re-
drawn with the relevant boxes removed to simplify the design. 
4.3 Stakeholder Interactions 
Though the models derived in Sections 4.1 & 4.2 appear very similar on paper, they differ 
significantly in terms of the engagement of the major stakeholders as defined for the 
majority of mainline operations, namely the Infrastructure Manager (IM) and the Railway 
Undertaking (RU). 
4.3.1 Physical Stakeholder Boundaries & Interfaces 
The stakeholder interactions on the physical model are relatively simple as shown in Fig.  
4-3, as (generally) the IM owns the buildings that contain the control centre and equipment 
rooms as well as all of the trackside infrastructure, whilst the RU (usually) owns the trains 
that it uses to run its service. From the end-user point of view, as IM’s are generally 
responsible for the routing of trains, Line Controllers usually work for them, whilst as RU’s 
are responsible for the delivery of service and Train Operators are often part of their 
organisation. 
 
 
Fig.  4-3 RCS Physical Model Stakeholder Interactions 
4.3.2 Functional Stakeholder Boundaries & Interfaces 
As shown in Fig.  4-4, the stakeholder interactions on the functional model are somewhat 
more complicated, as there is significant overlap of responsibility between the IM and RU of 
at least two of the functional layers, namely Train Performance and Safety & Protection. 
Infrastructure Manager 
Railway Undertaking 
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Fig.  4-4 RCS Functional Model Stakeholder Interactions 
Route Performance (generally) falls exclusively within the realm of the IM as they are 
responsible for the allocations of train paths on the network. 
Safety & Protection requires strong interaction between the infrastructure and rolling stock 
elements (and hence strong interface between the IM and RU), as the safety of where a train 
can travel is predominantly based around constraints of the infrastructure at a particular 
point in time, but is also dependent on the performance capability of individual trains. It is 
also essential to the functionality of systems such as ATP for an intrinsic link between the 
infrastructure and on-board sub-systems as certain conditions must be met by the 
infrastructure sub-system in order for the on-board sub-system to intervene in an unsafe 
situation. 
Train Performance will always require an on-board rolling stock element (and hence be the 
responsibility of the RU), but can also require significant input from the infrastructure (and 
hence the IM) for more advanced functions such as ATO and C-DAS that rely heavily on real-
time information about the network from the TMS. 
4.4 Functional to Physical Translation 
When considering the development of RCS systems, we must not only derive the system’s 
functional requirements, but also determine how they will be delivered into the real world; 
in other words, how the system specified in the functional model relates to the products 
delivered in the physical model and hence how migration strategies can be developed as 
shown in Fig.  4-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructure Manager 
Railway Undertaking 
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Fig.  4-5 RCS Development & Implementation 
The challenge with developing RCS systems is keeping track of the development of the 
system from conception through to implementation. This can be further complicated by the 
fact that we must develop the system based on requirements using a functional model and 
then implement it using a physical model. What I propose is a simple coding system that 
allows solutions to requirements to be tracked to individual products easily throughout the 
complete development and delivery lifecycle. 
Firstly, with the functional model, we identify each layer by a single unique letter as shown 
in Fig.  4-6. 
    
Fig.  4-6 RCS Functional Sub-System Identification 
R 
S 
T 
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We can now easily label all our requirements with R, S or T depending on what layer they 
relate to. For example, if Requirement 1 is “System shall ensure safe separation of trains” 
then we would label this 1S as it is a Safety requirement. If Requirement 2 is “System shall 
route trains automatically” then we label that 2R as it is Route Performance, etc. 
When we come to the physical model, we likewise label this with a single letter to represent 
each location, as shown in Fig.  4-7. 
   
Fig.  4-7 RCS Physical Sub-System Identification 
This enables us to now keep track of all sub-systems and products that will make up the 
completed system architecture and we can combine these with the functional model 
requirements to determine what functional layer individual products belong to and even 
what requirements they are fulfilling. 
Generally, there are a finite number of relationships between the functional layers and the 
physical locations. These are shown in Table 4-1. 
 A B C D 
R X X   
S X X X X 
T X  X X 
Table 4-1 Possible Physical Locations of RCS Functional Sub-Systems 
For examples: 
 An interlocking system could be located in an equipment room and be part of the 
Safety Layer, so would be labelled SB. 
 A traffic management system would be part of Route Performance and located in 
the control centre, so would be labelled RA. 
 The ATO box would of course be located on the rolling stock and be part of Train 
Performance, so would be labelled TD.
A 
B 
C 
D 
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5. Specific RCS Systems 
This Chapter will explore how the main types of RCS, as defined in Section 1.7, can be 
mapped onto the generic system model developed in Chapter 4. 
5.1 Conventional Signalling 
The main sub-system elements of conventional signalling (as defined in Section 1.7.1) are 
the following 
 The Operational Control System (OCS) 
 The Interlocking (Inx) 
 Train (and points) Detection (TD) 
 Automatic Train Protections (ATP) 
 Signals 
Since the OCS is the Line Controller’s main interface and is used to route the trains around 
the network, it is clearly part of Route Performance. 
The Inx, TD and ATP are all elements that ensure the safety of the train path and prevent the 
train from carrying out an unsafe movement. They are therefore all part of Safety & 
Protection. 
As the signals are the means of informing the Train Operator about their permitted 
movement (and hence the Train Operator’s primary interface to the RCS system), they are 
part of Train Performance. 
We can therefore map the main functional elements for conventional signalling onto the 
generic model as shown in Fig.  5-1. 
 
Fig.  5-1 Conventional Signalling Functional Sub-systems 
If we then repeat this exercise for the physical model, we can see where these products are 
(usually) implemented on the railway, as shown in Fig.  5-2. 
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Fig.  5-2 Conventional Signalling Sub-System Physical Locations 
From these two models, we can extrapolate the system flow and the products that make up 
each individual sub-system for generic Conventional Signalling in relation to locations, as 
shown in Fig.  5-3. 
 
Fig.  5-3 Conventional Signalling System Flow 
This then leads to the location map shown in Table 5-1 for Conventional Signalling. 
 A B C D 
R OCS    
S  Inx ATP(lineside) 
TD 
ATP(on-board) 
T   Signals  
Table 5-1 Conventional Signalling Location Map 
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We can therefore define these subsystems with the following suffixes to simultaneously 
identify their location and functionality: 
 OCS-RA 
 Inx-SB 
 ATP(lineside)-SC 
 TD-SC 
 ATP(on-board)-SD 
 Signal-TC 
5.2 CBTC 
The main sub-system elements of full moving block CBTC (as defined in Section 1.7.2) are the 
following: 
 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) 
 Automatic Train Control (ATC) which consists of: 
o Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 
o Automatic Train Operation (ATO) 
 Train (and points) Detection (TD) 
The ATS automates and regulates the network service as part of the control system, so is 
therefore part of Route Performance. 
The ATC can be thought of as the central infrastructure element of the system (usually 
located in an equipment room) that works with the TD to determine that trains are safe to 
move. Both of these elements are therefore part of Safety & Protection. 
The ATP is the on-board element of the system that ensures the train does not overstep its 
authority. It is therefore also part of Safety & Protection. 
The ATO is responsible for driving the train between designated stopping points; therefore it 
is part of Train Performance. 
We can therefore map the main functional elements of full moving block CBTC onto the 
generic system model as shown in Fig.  5-4.  
 
Fig.  5-4 CBTC Functional Sub-systems 
  
68 
 
If we then repeat this exercise for the physical model, we can see where these products are 
(usually) implemented on the railway, as shown in Fig.  5-5. 
 
Fig.  5-5 CBTC Sub-System Physical Locations 
From these two models, we can extrapolate the system flow and the products that make up 
each individual sub-system for a generic CBTC system in relation to locations as shown in Fig.  
5-6. 
 
Fig.  5-6 CBTC System Flow 
This then leads to the location map shown in Table 5-2 for CBTC. 
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 A B C D 
R ATS    
S  ATC TD ATP 
T    ATO 
Table 5-2 CBTC Location Map 
Therefore, we can define these subsystems with the following suffixes to simultaneously 
identify their location and functionality: 
 ATS-RA 
 ATC-SB 
 TD-SC 
 ATP-SD 
 ATO-TD 
5.3 ERTMS 
The main sub-systems of ERTMS (as defined in Section 1.7.3) are the following: 
 European Traffic Management Layer (ETML) 
 European Train Control System (ETCS) 
 Global System for Mobiles – Railways (GSM-R) 
The ETML is very much associated with the operating rules and traffic management of the 
railway and therefore clearly forms part of Route Performance. 
GSM-R defines the wireless Communications for the system and thus forms part of the 
communications path. 
We can therefore map the main functional elements for ERTMS onto the generic model as 
shown in Fig.  5-7.  
 
Fig.  5-7 ERTMS Functional Sub-systems 
However, this does not easily translate onto the physical architecture due to the number of 
sub-systems that make up the ETCS system, as well as a number of additional elements that 
are required for ETCS Levels 1 & 2. 
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Therefore, we must consider the following main elements that make up the ETCS system in 
order to develop the physical model: 
 Balises (fixed and switchable) 
 Lineside Encoder Unit (LEU) (for Level 1 only) 
 Radio Block Centre (RBC) (for Levels 2 & 3) 
 Driver Machine Interface (DMI) 
 European Vital Computer (EVC) (NOTE: for the purposes of this study, this will include 
all associated systems that make up the ETCS on-board sub-system including GSM-R 
modems, Balise Readers, Odometer, train interface and Juridical Recorder Units) 
We must also consider the following key sub-systems that are required for ETCS Levels 1 & 2, 
but are not within the scope of ETCS itself: 
 Interlocking (Inx) 
 Train (and points) Detection (TD) 
The Inx and TD perform the same safety-critical functionality in ETCS Levels 1 & 2 as they 
perform for conventional signalling and are thus part of Safety & Protection. 
Balises are effectively another communication channel (though in their case unidirectional) 
from the infrastructure to the train. 
Both the LEU and RBC take the safety-critical data and transform it into a form that can be 
transmitted to the train and they are therefore also part of Safety & Protection. 
As the EVC carries out the safety-critical on-board functions (including speed supervision and 
intervention), it too is part of Safety & Protection. 
As the DMI informs the Train Operator about their permitted movement (and hence the 
Train Operator’s primary interface to the RCS system), it is part of Train Performance. 
This results in three specific functional models of ERTMS for ETCS levels 1, 2 and 3 as shown 
in Fig.  5-8, Fig.  5-9 & Fig.  5-10. 
 
Fig.  5-8 ERTMS Functional Sub-systems (ETCS Level 1) 
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Fig.  5-9 ERTMS Functional Sub-systems (ETCS Level 2)  
 
Fig.  5-10 ERTMS Sub-System Physical Locations (ETCS Level 3) 
We can now develop three separate physical models of where these products are (usually) 
implemented on the railway for the three ETCS Levels of ERTMS as shown in Fig.  5-11, Fig.  
5-12 and Fig.  5-13. 
 
Fig.  5-11 ERTMS Sub-System Physical Locations (ETCS Level 1)  
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Fig.  5-12 ERTMS Sub-System Physical Locations (ETCS Level 2)  
 
Fig.  5-13 ERTMS Sub-System Physical Locations (ETCS Level 3) 
Notice how balises are divided into two types: 
 Switchable Balises (used in Level 1 only) are purely a communication channel 
 Fixed balises are a critical absolute position reference point and are therefore an 
intrinsic part of the Safety & Protection layer 
From these four models, we can extrapolate the system flow and the products that make up 
each individual sub-system for ERTMS/ETCS Levels 1, 2 & 3 in relation to locations as shown 
in Fig.  5-14, Fig.  5-15 & Fig.  5-16. 
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Fig.  5-14 ERTMS System Flow (ETCS Level 1)  
 
Fig.  5-15 ERTMS System Flow (ETCS Level 2)  
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Fig.  5-16 ERTMS System Flow (ETCS Level 3)  
This then leads to the location map shown in Table 5-3 for ERTMS. 
 A B C D 
R ETML    
S  Inx 
RBC 
LEU 
TD 
Balise 
 
EVC 
T    DMI 
Table 5-3 ERTMS Location Map 
We can therefore define these subsystems with the following suffixes to simultaneously 
identify their location and functionality: 
 ETML-RA 
 Inx-SB 
 RBC-SB 
 LEU-SB 
 TD-SC 
 Balise-SC 
 EVC-SD 
 DMI-TD 
5.3.1 ETCS Implemented With TMS & C-DAS 
As the ETML layer of ERTMS is currently undefined, it is quite common for operators to 
utilise commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ TMS systems (as defined in Section 1.7.5.1) in conjunction 
with ETCS in order to provide better traffic optimisation. Operators are also starting to 
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implement C-DAS systems (as defined in Section 1.7.5.2) to improve the performance 
reliability of services. 
As the TMS is effectively the control system for the railway (responsible for routing, 
timetabling, etc.) it is clearly part of Route Performance. 
C-DAS is all about improving the performance of individual trains, so is therefore part of 
Train Performance.  
 
Fig.  5-17 ETCS With TMS & C-DAS Functional Model  
Though these two additional systems can theoretically be implemented with any ETCS Level, 
we shall utilise ETCS Level 2 as the baseline for the purpose of this example to generate the 
physical model shown in Fig.  5-19. 
 
Fig.  5-18 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Functional Model  
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Fig.  5-19 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Physical Model  
We can extrapolate the system flow and the products that make up each individual sub-
system for a combined TMS / C-DAS / ETCS Level 2 system in relation to locations as shown 
in Fig.  5-20. 
 
Fig.  5-20 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS System Flow  
This then leads to the location map shown in Table 5-4 for a combined TMS / C-DAS / ETCS 
Level 2 system. 
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 A B C D 
R TMS    
S  Inx 
RBC 
LEU 
TD 
Balise 
 
EVC 
T    DMI 
C-DAS 
Table 5-4 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Location Map 
Therefore, we can define these subsystems with the following suffixes to simultaneously 
identify their location and functionality: 
 TMS-RA 
 Inx-SB 
 RBC-SB 
 LEU-SB 
 TD-SC 
 Balise-SC 
 EVC-SD 
 DMI-TD 
 C-DAS-TD 
5.3.2 ETCS Implemented With ATO 
It is possible to implement ATO as an “add-on” to an ETCS system in order to provide 
consistency of driving style and hence achieve the improved performance that ATO delivers 
as part of a CBTC system. It is generally assumed that a TMS system will be in-place as part of 
the system for the ATO to communicate with for its stopping points. 
As we know from Section 5.2, the ATO is part of Train Performance; therefore an 
implementation of ATO with an ETCS Level 2 system is almost identical to the 
implementation with C-DAS shown in Section 5.3.1, as shown in Fig.  5-21, Fig.  5-22, Fig.  
5-23 & Fig.  5-24. 
 
Fig.  5-21 ETCS With ATO Functional Model  
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Fig.  5-22 ETCS Level 2 With ATO Functional Model  
 
Fig.  5-23 ETCS Level 2 With ATO Physical Model 
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Fig.  5-24 ETCS Level 2 With ATO System Flow  
This then leads to the location map shown in Table 5-5 for a combined ATO / ETCS Level 2 
system. 
 A B C D 
R TMS    
S  Inx 
RBC 
LEU 
TD 
Balise 
 
EVC 
T    DMI 
ATO 
Table 5-5 ETCS Level 2 With ATO Location Map 
We can therefore define these subsystems with the following suffixes to simultaneously 
identify their location and functionality: 
 TMS-RA 
 Inx-SB 
 RBC-SB 
 LEU-SB 
 TD-SC 
 Balise-SC 
 EVC-SD 
 DMI-TD 
 ATO-TD 
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5.4 PTC 
The main sub-systems of the example PTC system (as defined in Fig.  1-16 in Section 1.7.4) 
are the following: 
 The Operational Control System (OCS) 
 The Positive Train Control (PTC) system which consists of: 
o The on-board system that determines the train’s position and provides 
intervention if required 
o The central interlocking system that monitors each train’s position against 
its virtual block database to determine the train’s movement authority 
 The Driver’s Display in the cab 
Since the OCS is the Line Controller’s main interface and is used to route the trains around 
the network, it is clearly part of Route Performance. 
The PTC system is primary part of Safety & Protection, as it ensures the safe separation of all 
trains as well as movement of points, etc. 
As the Display informs the Train Operator about their permitted movement (and hence the 
Train Operator’s primary interface to the RCS system), it is part of Train Performance. 
We can therefore map our main functional elements for this example PTC system onto the 
generic model as shown in Fig.  5-25.  
 
Fig.  5-25 PTC Functional Sub-systems 
If we then repeat this exercise for the physical model, we can see where these products are 
(usually) implemented on the railway, as shown in Fig.  5-26. 
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Fig.  5-26 PTC Sub-System Physical Locations  
The PTC in the Equipment Room will be the central interlocking and control system, whilst 
the onboard PTC will be the system that manages speed control and intervention of the 
vehicle. Only Points & Crossings (P&C) control and detection will be required in the trackside 
area. 
From these two models, we can extrapolate the system flow and the products that make up 
each individual sub-system for the example PTC system in relation to locations as shown in 
Fig.  5-27: 
 
Fig.  5-27 PTC System Flow 
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This then leads to the location map shown in Table 5-6 for PTC. 
 A B C D 
R OCS    
S  PTC(lineside)  PTC(on-board) 
T    Display 
Table 5-6 PTC Location Map 
Therefore, we can define these sub-systems with the following suffixes to simultaneously 
identify their location and functionality: 
 OCS-RA 
 Interlocking-SB 
 PTC(lineside)-SB 
 PTC(on-board)-SD 
 Display-TD  
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6. Proposed Method for Modelling RCS Capability 
I have so far proposed generic models for RCS systems that can map any system onto them 
in order to more clearly define the relationship between their functionality and physical 
architecture. 
I would now like to propose a method for potentially utilising the functional model to 
determine the capability of an RCS system based on the requirements to achieve a particular 
number of Trains Per Hour (TPH). 
However, in order to explain this method, I must first introduce the concept of negative-
feedback control systems. 
6.1 Negative Feedback Control Systems 
Many systems are subject to outside influence that can affect their output (Bequette, 2003), 
as shown in Fig.  6-1. 
 
 
Fig.  6-1 Open-Loop System with Interference  
In the example of Fig.  6-1, System A has input X with the aim of achieving output Y. 
However, due to the interference being introduced to the system, it is more likely that the 
output will either fail to reach the target output or drop below it over time. 
It has long been established that by utilising an appropriate sub-system ‘B’ that feeds back 
the output of system ‘A’ to its input, this can enable the output of system ‘A’ to be stabilised 
(Bequette, 2003), as shown in Fig.  6-2. 
 
Fig.  6-2 Closed-Loop Negative Feedback System  
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6.2 RCS as a Negative Feedback Control System 
An initial view of the RCS functional model developed in section 4.1 does not lend itself to 
being modelled as a negative feedback control system. However, it should be considered 
how RCS operates within the overall railway system. Specifically, it should be observed how 
the RCS system controls and interacts with the rolling stock. It is fundamentally the functions 
of the Safety & Protection (S&P) layer such as train detection, interlocking and ATP that 
permit trains to move and limit the capacity of the system. Therefore, it can be shown that 
the operation of the railway works through the S&P layer as shown in Fig.  6-3. 
 
 
Fig.  6-3 Railway Operation of RCS System  
It is now possible to re-draw the RCS Functional Model as a negative-feedback control 
system, where the S&P layer is the main system and the Route Performance (RP) & Train 
Performance (TP) layers are the feedback systems as shown in Fig.  6-4.  
 
Fig.  6-4 RCS System as a Negative-Feedback Control System 
This now means that in terms of operation of the railway’s performance, the RCS system 
works in the following way: 
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1. The S&P layer determines the maximum TPH that the system can deliver 
2. The TP & RP layers ensure that that maximum TPH is maintained 
3. The interference in this case is anything that causes trains to not run to timetable 
(passengers holding doors open, obstructions in the track, breakdowns, etc.) 
6.3 Specific RCS Systems in a Negative-Feedback Model 
It is possible for the main types of RCS mapped onto the generic model in Chapter 5 to be 
converted into this negative-feedback model as shown in the following sections. 
6.3.1 Conventional Signalling 
The conventional signalling system shown in Fig.  5-3 can be redrawn as a negative feedback 
system as shown in Fig.  6-5. 
 
Fig.  6-5 Conventional Signalling System as a Negative-Feedback System (Broken Loop) 
As can be seen, a fundamental flaw with conventional signalling is the lack of direct feedback 
between the Train and Route Performance layers (effectively a broken loop), hence often 
making it difficult to recover quickly and efficiently from incidents. 
6.3.2 CBTC 
The CBTC system shown in Fig.  5-6 maps clearly onto the negative feedback model, 
providing a fully closed-loop system as shown in Fig.  6-6. 
 
Fig.  6-6 CBTC System as a Closed-Loop Negative-Feedback System 
This is mainly due to CBTC systems often being designed as a complete single system, with 
the primary requirement being to continuously deliver as many trains as possible within an 
hour, with little concern for timetabling different trains and service patterns. 
  
86 
 
6.3.3 ERTMS 
For the purposes of this analysis, we shall concentrate on two versions, ERTMS Level 2 and 
ETCS Level 2 with TMS & C-DAS, to provide a comparison of what the additional systems 
provide in terms of negative feedback. 
The ERTMS Level 2 system as shown in Fig.  5-15 can be redrawn as a negative feedback 
system as shown in Fig.  6-7. 
 
Fig.  6-7  ERTMS Level 2 as a Negative-Feedback System (Broken Loop) 
As with conventional signalling, ETCS on its own does not provide direct feedback between 
the train and Route Performance layers (effectively a broken loop), hence often making it 
difficult to recover quickly and efficiently from incidents. 
The combined ETCS Level 2 with TMS & C-DAS systems as defined in Fig.  5-20 can be 
redrawn as a closed loop system as shown in Fig.  6-8.  
 
Fig.  6-8  ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS as a Closed-Loop Negative-Feedback System 
Although the main sub-systems (Interlocking, ETCS, TMS & C-DAS) have been developed 
separately as distinct sub-systems, Fig.  9-4 shows how they can be integrated together to 
form a complete system to deliver and maintain a particular train capacity based on 
timetable requirements. There are, of course, several challenges, to this such as the issue of 
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the driver not having a single source of truth to drive to (having separate displays for both 
ETCS & C-DAS). 
6.3.4 PTC 
The PTC system shown in Fig.  5-27 can be shown as a negative feedback system as shown in 
Fig.  6-9.  
 
Fig.  6-9  PTC as a Negative-Feedback System (Broken Loop) 
As with conventional signalling and ETCS without TMS & C-DAS, PTC on its own does not 
provide direct feedback between the train and Route Performance layers (effectively a 
broken loop), hence often making it difficult to recover quickly and efficiently from incidents. 
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7. Organisational Interfaces 
For many mainline applications, there is frequetly a segregation of the operations between 
the infrastructure and the rolling stock. Often on European Railways, there is an 
Infrastructure Manager (IM) who manages, operates and maintains the infrastructure assets, 
and a Railway Undertaking (RU) who operates passenger or freight services and hence 
manages, operates and maintains the rolling stock and its associated assets. 
This means that there will often be a minimum of two stakeholders with a vested interest in 
the development, implementation and operation of the RCS system who will have 
responsibilities for different sub-systems within the RCS system, both in terms of delivery 
and operational maintenance. It is therefore important to consider operational interfaces 
between sub-systems, as well as purely technical ones. This will be explored in the 
remainder of this Chapter. 
As an example, let us look at the combined TMS, ETCS Level 2 & C-DAS that was defined in 
Section 5.3.1. Since we have the functional elements in the physical model, we can 
extrapolate the high-level system architecture into a system flow diagram that shows which 
components and sub-systems must be implemented within each stakeholder’s assets as 
shown in Fig.  7-1. 
    
Fig.  7-1 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS System Flow Organisational Boundaries 
From this, we can see that there are a number of key interfaces that must be managed both 
internally within the organisations as well as externally between the IM and RU. The 
interfaces can also either be internally within the three main functional layers: Route 
Performance (RP), Safety & Protection (S&P) and Train Performance (TP) or between them. 
A summary of the main sub-system interfaces are shown in Table 7-1. 
 
Infrastructure Manager 
Railway Undertaking 
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System 1 System 2 Functional Interface Organisational 
Interface 
TMS Inx RP – S&P Internal IM 
Inx RBC Internal S&P Internal IM 
RBC EVC Internal S&P IM – RU 
Balise EVC Internal S&P IM – RU 
EVC DMI S&P – TP Internal RU 
EVC C-DAS S&P – TP Internal RU 
C-DAS TMS TP – RP RU – IM 
Table 7-1 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Functional & Organisational Interfaces 
As can be seen, there are 3 main types of organisation interfaces: 
 Those internal to the IM 
 Those internal to the RU 
 Those that crossover between the IM & RU 
The following Sections of this Chapter will look at these three types of interface in more 
detail, as well as what technical interfaces they cover and highlight some of the key 
challenges that need to be addressed to manage them. 
7.1 Internal IM Interfaces 
There are two main internal interfaces that the IM must manage, as shown in Table 7-2. 
System 1 System 2 Functional Interface Organisational 
Interface 
TMS Inx RP – S&P Internal IM 
Inx RBC Internal S&P Internal IM 
Table 7-2 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Internal IM Interfaces 
The interface between the Interlocking system and the RBC is internal to the S&P layer which 
means that both elements are safety critical. The interface will usually be a fixed connection 
between the interlocking and RBC, which are often co-located in the same equipment room. 
The interface between the TMS and the Interlocking system is a bit more complicated, as it is 
also a functional interface between the RP and S&P layers. This creates a number of issues 
and challenges: 
 It is vital that the TMS cannot override the Interlocking in any way. 
 The TMS and Interlocking are likely to be located in separate buildings, so a long 
distance communication network will likely be required 
 The TMS and RBC may potentially be procured from separate suppliers, so it is vital 
that a common communications protocol is agreed between the two systems 
As can be seen, the IM has no sole responsibility for any TP functions, as these are related to 
the performance of individual trains. 
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7.2 Internal RU Interfaces 
There are two main internal interfaces that the RU must manage, as shown in Table 7-3. 
System 1 System 2 Functional Interface Organisational 
Interface 
EVC DMI S&P – TP Internal RU 
EVC C-DAS S&P – TP Internal RU 
Table 7-3 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Internal RU Interfaces 
Both internal RU interfaces deal with the functional interface between the S&P and TP 
layers. However, as the first one (EVC & DMI) is part of the complete ETCS on-board system, 
the interface should be managed by the supplier as part of the ETCS specification. 
The second interface (between the EVC & C-DAS) is more complex, as not only is C-DAS a 
separate system from ETCS (and hence could be provided by a separate supplier), but its 
display could potentially have some similar outputs to the ETCS DMI, creating a conflict 
between the two. Thus there are the following issues and challenges with this interface: 
 It is vital that C-DAS cannot override the EVC in any way 
 C-DAS and ETCS may potentially be procured from separate suppliers, so it is vital 
that a common communications protocol is agreed between the two systems 
 If the DMI and C-DAS display are fitted in parallel, then a detailed human factors 
assessment must be carried out to ensure that there is no contradictory information 
displayed on them 
As can be seen, the RU has no sole responsibility for any RP functions, as these are related to 
the performance of the overall railway network, not individual trains. 
7.3 Interfaces Between IM & RU 
The most complex interfaces to manage are possibly those that crossover between the IM 
and RU. The main three interfaces that fall into this category are shown in Table 7-4. 
System 1 System 2 Functional Interface Organisational 
Interface 
RBC EVC Internal S&P IM – RU 
Balise EVC Internal S&P IM – RU 
C-DAS TMS TP – RP RU – IM 
Table 7-4 ETCS Level 2 With TMS & C-DAS Organisational Interfaces 
Although the first two interfaces (RBC-EVC & Balise-EVC) are both internal to the S&P layer 
and parts of the complete ETCS system, they may still have challenging interface issues as 
the on-board and infrastructure elements of the ETCS can be procured separately from 
different suppliers. Although the European Technical Standards for Interoperability (TSI) 
(UNIFE, 2013) manage compatibility between the on-board and infrastructure sub-systems, 
there are ‘gaps’ in these standards that member states must ‘plug’ using National Technical 
Rules (NTR). Thus every Country could implement ETCS slightly differently. It is therefore 
critical that extensive laboratory and site testing is carried out of the interface between the 
ETCS on-board and infrastructure elements to ensure compatibility between the two. This 
results in the following issues and challenges: 
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 The wireless communication between the RBC and the EVC must work off the same 
protocol and ensure that they are both sending and receiving the relevant data that 
they expect from each other. 
 The on-board system must interpret the rolling stock’s braking and motoring 
characteristics correctly and be in line with the principles by which the infrastructure 
layout within the RBC and the placement of balises have been designed to 
The other interface between the RU and IM, C-DAS-TMS, is more complicated still, as it 
covers the interface between the TP and RP layers. This means that it may not only require 
the interface of two separate suppliers, but that it is also the key point where the overall 
management of the railway network (an IM responsibility) must work together with the 
performance of individual trains (a RU responsibility) to ensure the most efficient service. 
This could potentially lead to conflicting requirements between the RU and the IM. For 
example the IM may want to get as many trains as possible to pass through a particular 
section in an hour in order to sell more train paths, whilst an RU that uses Diesel trains may 
want their vehicles to drive as economically as possible in order to keep fuel costs low. This 
results in issues and challenges such as: 
 C-DAS and TMS may potentially be procured from separate suppliers, so it is vital 
that a common communications protocol is agreed between the two systems 
 An agreement must be reached between the IM and RU of agreed targets for key 
outputs such as journey times, line capacity, fuel efficiency, etc. 
 The development of the specific application data for the TMS and C-DAS should be 
developed by a single integrated design team if at all possible 
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8. Project Organisations for Developing & Delivering RCS 
Traditionally, when managing assets, the railway industry has adopted what has come to be 
known as the ‘silo’ approach, where assets are grouped together in common sub-systems 
such as Rolling Stock, Signalling and Control Centres, each with their own team of specialists 
who manage their assets separately from the other teams, with little co-ordination and co-
operation. 
This approach has a tendency to lead to conflicting requirements when delivering new 
systems, as each team gathers their own requirements individually and feeds them to the 
design team as shown in Fig.  8-1. 
 
Fig.  8-1 Challenges of RCS Delivery Structures 
This, in turn, can lead to large amounts of design re-work cycles as the different 
requirements are fed to the design team at different times as shown in Fig.  8-2. 
 
Fig.  8-2 Conflicting Requirements and Re-work Cycles 
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This can be avoided by utilising a systems engineering approach as shown in Fig.  8-3. 
 
Fig.  8-3 Role of Systems Engineering Team 
The Systems Engineering team: 
 Acts as single point of contact with the client 
 Is responsible for all requirements capture 
 Disseminates sub-system requirements to relevant project teams 
 Manages all interfaces between all sub-systems 
 Manages all configuration control 
 Approves changes to the system made by the Design Team 
This now enables a more streamlined design process, where the Systems Engineering team 
‘filters’ all the design requirements so that there are no conflicting interests and reduces the 
amount of required re-work cycles as shown in Fig.  8-4.  
 
Fig.  8-4 Systematic Approach to RCS Design & Development 
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8.1 Current Project Delivery structures 
As can be seen from Chapter 4, one of the complexities of RCS is that it is actually a 
system that is itself made up of other systems. This is often referred to as a System Of 
Systems (SOS) (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2014). An important aspect of the delivery of 
any complex SOS such as RCS is the structure of the delivery process. 
Although there are many variations of delivery structure employed throughout the 
railway industry, they broadly fall into two main types, Project Management led and 
Engineering Management led. 
(King, 2016) 
8.1.1 Project Management Led Delivery 
In a project management led structure there is usually a single Project Manager 
responsible for both the System Engineering (sometime called Project Engineering) 
and Design Engineering functions as shown in Fig.  8-5. The Systems Engineers are 
responsible for technical compliance against standards, whilst Design Engineers 
develop the scheme layouts and specific application data. 
(King, 2016) 
 
Fig.  8-5 General Project Management Led Structure (King, 2016) 
The advantage of this approach is that it has a simple structure and is very focussed 
on the delivery of the project, ensuring that delivery targets are met and that the 
project is kept within budget. 
However, it has several disadvantages. Firstly there can be a lack of technical 
direction that can lead to the system being unreliable or not meeting requirements. 
Also as there is such a strong focus on delivery, technical quality can be sacrificed, 
resulting in poor performance. The capture and control of requirements is also very 
difficult using this model, as the System Engineers have no authority over the Design 
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Engineers and hence control of the flow of requirements from their fundamental 
needs to design requirements. 
(King, 2016) 
8.1.2 Engineering Management Led Delivery 
In an engineering management led structure, there are two management roles that 
report to the Project Director, a Project Manager and an Engineering Manager, as 
shown in Fig.  8-6. Such an arrangement and has been adopted by many 
organisations (Hollywell, 2014). 
(King, 2016) 
 
Fig.  8-6 General Engineering Management Led Structure (King, 2016) 
The Project Manager still retains responsibility for the delivery and budget of the 
project, but the Engineering Manager takes responsibility for the technical quality of 
the project and the delivery of the system architecture. 
This approach has the advantage of being more focussed on technical quality and 
enables better requirements capture, as there is more of a balance between the 
delivery of the project and ensuring the system’s technical quality and compliance. 
However, it has other disadvantages.  Keeping control of the requirements can still 
be difficult, as the System Engineers still do not have direct authority over the Design 
Engineers.  This model can also suffer quite badly from scope creep if the Design 
Engineers are not kept in check and engage directly with the end users to add more 
and more features.  There is also a risk of cost and programme overrun as the 
solution could become over-engineered. 
(King, 2016) 
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8.2 Proposed System-Centric Structure 
We should approach creating the project team structure that we require to deliver an 
RCS system in the same way that we develop an RCS system, by first defining the 
fundamental requirements of the structure.  In terms of a system like this, there are 
three fundamental requirements that must be maintained by the team: 
1. Programme 
a. Ensure overall project delivery including Contract Performance Requirements  
b. Ensure project is delivered on-time and to budget 
2. System Development 
a. Ensure system meets operational, maintenance & performance requirements 
b. Ensure integration of all sub-systems into complete systems and manage 
associated interfaces 
3. Design 
a. Design the layout of the new system 
b. Ensure the safety & integrity of the new system 
From these requirements we can extrapolate three key roles: 
1. Project management 
2. Systems Engineering 
3. Design Engineering 
The key is how these roles will interact with each other.  I would propose that there 
should be three managers who report to the Project Director: 
1. Project Manager 
2. Systems Engineering Manager 
3. Design Authority Manager 
The Project Manager and their team would be responsible for keeping the project to 
time and budget.  
The Systems Engineering Manager and their team would be responsible for gathering 
all end-user requirements and developing the system requirements and architecture.  
The Design Authority Manager and their team would be responsible for the design of 
the layout and the specific application data ensuring that the system designed is not 
only fit for purpose but also fundamentally safe.  
There should be a two-way interaction between the Project Manager and Systems 
Engineering Manager, with the latter acting as a ‘technical translator’ to the Project 
Manager on the issues of the system.  The System Engineering team should also be 
the only team that engages with the end-user(s) to identify their requirements.  It is 
also the responsibility of the Systems Engineering team to maintain a database of all 
requirements and disseminate them as appropriate to the Design team.  
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The Design Authority Manager and their team must design the system to ensure that 
it is safe as well as meeting all technical requirements, which should in turn be 
checked by the Systems Engineering team to ensure that all requirements are met. 
(King, 2016) 
This proposed structure is shown in Fig.  8-7. 
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Fig.  8-7 Proposed System-Centric Structure (King, 2016) 
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9. Findings and Recommendations 
RCS systems are critical to both the safety and performance of the railway and are complex Systems 
Of Systems. They have clearly defined functional sub-systems that make up these two key criteria. 
A systematic approach to the deployment, as well as the development, of RCS is vital in order to 
ensure successful development, delivery and integration of modern RCS systems such as ERTMS, 
CBTC, PTC, etc. 
This report has covered predominantly four main areas of research in relation to the challenges 
facing the development and delivery of RCS systems: 
1. A study of the development and delivery of RCS Systems 
2. The benefits of a generic RCS system model 
3. Modelling RCS as a negative-feedback control system 
4. The issues of current project delivery structures 
This Chapter has therefore been divided into five Sections, where the conclusion of each of these 
four topics will be examined in detail before concluding with recommendations for further work in 
this area of research. 
9.1 Development and Delivery of RCS Systems 
It must be acknowledged that RCS systems go through at least two V-lifecycle models as shown in 
Chapter 3; the first being the research and development carried out by the supplier to develop a 
generic system that can be taken to market, and the second being the specific application of the 
system required by a particular operator on their railway. 
Whilst Metro RCS systems are often procured as complete single systems, mainline RCS systems are 
often made up of multiple separately procured sub-systems that must then be integrated into a 
complete RCS system. This results in mainline applications of RCS having to follow a complex W-
lifecycle, where multiple suppliers’ development V-lifecycles must then be integrated by the 
operator in a separate V-lifecycle for the specific application. 
9.2 Generic System Model 
Though there are many types of RCS systems available throughout the world today, they can all be 
‘mapped’ onto a generic functional model that covers the key functional requirements of routing 
trains efficiently, ensuring the railway’s safety and optimising the performance of individual trains. 
However, these functional layers do not map directly onto physical locations, as components of key 
sub-systems are divided amongst rolling stock and infrastructure locations. Therefore, it is also 
necessary to have a physical model that individual sub-system components can be ‘mapped’ onto in 
order to manage implementation of the system. 
I believe that the proposed simple functional and physical models defined in Chapter 4, along with 
their defined suffix shorthand, are extremely useful in identifying how technology relates to the 
fundamental requirements of any RCS system. 
This report also shows in Chapter 5 how specific systems map onto the model and how different 
sub-systems are used to achieve the same requirements in different physical locations. 
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I hope that these models will make it easier for different members of the railway industry to 
understand how these different systems work and how they relate to each other. 
For further research, I would recommend investigating how models such as the ones defined in this 
research could be utilised to simplify the operational and technical design of transitions between 
different systems that are fitted on the same railway line. 
9.3 RCS As A Negative-Feedback Control System 
I propose that RCS systems can be modelled as a negative-feedback control system, where the S&P 
layer is the main system of the operational railway that determines the maximum TPH the system 
can deliver, whilst the RP & TP layers are the feedback systems that regulate the system to maintain 
that maximum TPH. 
I would propose for further research that this potential model is investigated further to determine if 
it can be modelled mathematically to ultimately determine what type of sub-systems are required in 
order to achieve the required TPH of a particular application. 
9.4 Proposed Delivery Organisation 
One of the main challenges facing the railway industry in terms of implementing RCS is not technical 
but managerial, particularly in the structure of project teams as shown in Chapter 8. 
I propose that the first major challenge is the relationship between Project Management, Systems 
Engineering and Design Engineering. The structure proposed in Section 8.2 offers a somewhat 
radical new approach to this challenge, which provides a good way forward in this area. 
However, I also feel that this is another area of study where significantly more research is required, 
particularly in relation to how assurance and approvals interface to delivery teams as well as the 
relationship between client and delivery organisations and the differences (if any) that are required 
between their structures. 
9.5 Future Work 
I would like to develop the proposed RCS negative feedback model further. Particularly, I would like 
to investigate if it is feasible to mathematically represent the RCS system both in the time domain 
using algebra and in the complex frequency domain utilising Laplace Transforms. From this, it should 
be feasible to use the model to determine if a particular system will be stable based on the 
functionality of the three functional layers. 
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